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ABSTRACT
GRASSROOTS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM WITHIN MILWAUKEE’S
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Many researchers and scholars have explored the Black urban experience and have often
chosen to focus on the systemic and institutionalized forms of racism that affect different aspects
of Black lives. Descriptions of central city lives as told by Black central city residents are starkly
similar to the descriptions of Black residents of industrialized cities throughout the United States.
Fragments of the Black urban experience are contained in discussions of the effects of urban
renewal efforts, including “redevelopment” and “revitalization,” beginning most heavily in the
1940s. Looking back at urban renewal designs and strategies from the 1940s through the 1980s is
crucial to beginning to understand the entirety of the Black urban experience. Much of the
literature on urban renewal focuses on the ramifications of legislative programs and the factors
that influenced decision making at multiple levels, primarily the individual, the community, the
larger city, and within public and private spheres. These pieces, however, do not tell the entire
story, and tend to leave out the influence that grassroots and community groups within central
city Black neighborhoods had over the revitalization of their immediate environments. While
some scholarship does engage with Black agency, it, again, tends to focus on what is happening
to local Black populations, not on what is being done by Black community members. This thesis
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focuses on a particular Black community and how their actions created change and, thus,
contributes to the evolving discussion of the Black urban experience.
It is important to investigate Black grassroots and community groups in order to come to
a fuller understanding of a crucial piece of the Black urban experience and to challenge a still
predominant viewpoint that the Black urban population was largely idle in terms of taking action
to influence their surroundings. In addition to exploring this marginalized history, this thesis
seeks to add to the narrative of Milwaukee’s Black population, whose voice has repeatedly and
intentionally been overpowered, and to expose a small portion of the structural and institutional
racism and disadvantage those in power have historically exposed this country’s Black
population to.
In order to accomplish these objectives, this thesis will examine the creation of
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, the subsequent destruction of this community that accompanied urban
renewal efforts, and the response of Black residents to this destruction. This thesis will focus on
the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., whose primary goal was to save the integrity of a
particular Black neighborhood through the preservation of housing and the integration of
residents into decision-making roles. To fully understand how Milwaukee fits into the narrative
of urban renewal experiences in the United States, preeminent scholars such as Gilbert Osofsky,
James R. Grossman, Arnold R. Hirsch, Thomas J. Sugrue, David M.P. Freund, Katherine
McKittrick, and Mindy Thompson Fullilove will be referenced as they have laid the groundwork
for how certain decisions came to be racialized to harm Black central city residents and the
effects that urban renewal efforts had on existing Black communities. In addition, scholars that
have studied the City of Milwaukee, such as John Gurda, Joe William Trotter, Jr., Patrick Jones,
and Paul Geib, will be utilized to piece together pieces of the Black urban experience that, to an
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extent, have already been explored. Archival materials from governmental entities and the
Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc. will be utilized to showcase first-hand accounts of
events and to emphasize the narratives of this particular Black community.
These existing documents and pieces of scholarship help to uncover one community’s
response to central city revitalization efforts in the post-industrial city of Milwaukee. They are
pieced together to expose a contradiction to the predominant view of the Black population while
emphasizing how outside factors work together to negatively influence environments and
populations deemed unfit or undesirable. Instead of perpetuating the acceptance of erasing
certain components of the Black urban experience, this research project seeks to give space to
discuss the activism among Black residents that took place in one urban setting while advocating
for the inclusion of Black histories into the history of Milwaukee. It is the hope of this author
that this research project will encourage future scholars to engage with the Black urban
experience in a way that emphasizes the activism of the Black community and exposes racism
within structural and institutional entities that subdue and omit the Black voice.

iv

To
my parents,
my sisters,
my teammate,
my daughter,
and all those that helped edit this document

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii
Dedication……………………………………………………………………………........v
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………....vii
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………viii
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………..ix
CHAPTERS
Chapter One: The Black Urban Experience: Reconnecting Black Histories to City Histories.......1
From South to North: The Great Migration.......................................................................14
Black Employment……………………………………………………………………….16
Black Housing and the Creation of the Inner City.............................................................19
Milwaukee’s Urban Renewal…………………………………………………………….30
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….42
Chapter Two: Walnut Street: Milwaukee’s Bronzeville…………………………………………47
Creating Community: Laying the Foundation for a Black Sense of Place………………51
The End of the Line…………………………………………………………………...…61
Urban Renewal as the Destruction of a Black Sense of Place and Root Shock………....65
Chapter Three: From Root Shock to Community Collaboration: Walnut Area Improvement
Council, Inc. …..……………………………………………………………………....................70
Establishment and Evolution: The Forward Progress of a Community Group………….72
Carrying on the Roots of Bronzeville’s Community Support…………………………...81
Organizational Growth into the Housing Market………………………………………..83
WAICO as a Powerful Voice…………………………………………………………….90
Milwaukee: A Model City?...............................................................................................91
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….............99
Chapter Four: Conclusions and Implications for Current and Future Research………………..104
References……………………………………………………………………………………....111

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of the Nonwhite Population of Milwaukee in 1940, 1950, and
1960……………………………………………………………………............................21
Figure 2. 1938 Milwaukee Residential Security Map Coloration Designations………………...24
Figure 3. 1938 Milwaukee Residential Security Map with Inner City Demarcation……………26
Figure 4. Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City
Boundaries of the Inner City Map…………………………………………………….....39
Figure 5. Map of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 1905-1940s……………………………………......49
Figure 6. WAICO Project Area Map………………………………………………………….....74
Figure 7. WAICO Triangle Area Map……………………………………………………...........85

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Black Population Growth in the City of Milwaukee, 1930-1970………………............16
Table 2. Black Home Owners and White Home Owners for the City of Milwaukee, 19401980....................................................................................................................................29

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACW………………………………………………………………...Artists Concerned in WAICO
FEPC………………………………………………………Fair Employment Practices Committee
FHLBB…………………………………………………………..Federal Home Loan Bank Board
HOLC…………………………………………………….……..Home Owner’s Loan Corporation
HUD………………………………………………………...…..Housing and Urban Development
I-43……………………………………………………………………………...……..Interstate 43
MUL…………………………………………………………………….Milwaukee Urban League
NAACP…………………………...National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAREB……………………………………………….National Association of Real Estate Boards
NHP…………………………………………………………………National Housing Partnership
RAT……………………………………………………………………….…….Remove All Trash
VISTA………………………………………………………….Volunteers In Service To America
WAICO………………………………………………….Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc.
WWI…………………………………………………………………………………..World War I
WWII…………………………………………………………………………………World War II
YMCA………………………………………………………..Young Men’s Christian Association

ix

Chapter One
The Black Urban Experience: Reconnecting Black Histories to City Histories

Black voices have traditionally been left out of discussions regarding Black1 experiences,
especially during instances of cultural upheaval. One such instance of this historical disregard is
that of the Black urban experience during the years comprising national and local urban renewal
projects. Although formalized federal urban renewal legislation ceased to gain much backing
after the 1970s, scholars are still attempting to understand the ramifications of urban renewal
projects that began in the 1940s. Research on this subject continues to be relevant because ideas
about the Black urban experience are changing, new urban renewal efforts continue to affect
residents, and there is much to learn from the histories that come out of cities affected by urban
renewal.
This particular thesis research project engages with a small neighborhood in the City of
Milwaukee surrounding a once thriving thoroughfare, Walnut Street, and the actions that
residents took to deal with the consequences of urban renewal. Although this case study is only a
small example of the many urban renewal projects that took place from the 1940s through the
1980s, it begins to bring to light the activism of Black residents in influencing their immediate
environment. However, to fully comprehend urban renewal as a movement, it is important to
explore the context of urban renewal in a broader, national sense.
To inform my preliminary background research, I explored concepts brought to light by
Gilbert Osofsky, focusing on Harlem, James R. Grossman and Arnold R. Hirsch, focusing on
1

This author has chosen to capitalize the term “Black” throughout this document. The Chicago Manual of Style 16th
Edition, Chapter 8, Rule 8.39 states “common designations of ethnic groups… are usually lowercased unless a
particular publisher or author prefers otherwise.” This particular author prefers the capitalization of the term “Black”
as it refers to a cultural and political formation of people, not a skin color. “White,” on the other hand, is not
capitalized due to negative ties with white supremacy groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan.
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Chicago, and Thomas J. Sugrue and David M.P. Freund, focusing on Detroit. Not only are there
demographic similarities between cities like Milwaukee, Harlem, Chicago, and Detroit, but there
are also similarities in larger matters, particularly when discussing housing discrimination. It is
through the examination of these particular scholars that these matters become increasingly
apparent. Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, and Freund focus primarily on the economic and
political landscapes that shaped the Black urban experience in these cities. In order to fully
understand the ramifications of these landscapes, one must delve into the reasoning behind
certain decisions and the effects that they have on those impacted by them, in this case, Black
Americans.2
Exploring these larger issues reveal loftier themes that arise out of urban renewal
projects, such as the deliberate “killing” of certain sections of the city, designated as urbicide by
Katherine McKittrick, and the emotional impacts of demolition and displacement, designated as
root shock by Mindy Thompson Fullilove. McKittrick and Fullilove utilize the discussions that
Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, and Freund engage with, but take the conversation a step
further by exploring how legislation and decision making have historically been conducted and
how residents, especially Black residents, were directly affected, both physically and mentally.
Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto and Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the
Great Migration by Gilbert Osofsky and James R. Grossman respectively, discuss the migration
of Black people from the South to the North for employment opportunities and due to their desire
to escape racial and social rejection and violence. Gilbert Osofsky focuses on the community of
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Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), James R. Grossman, Land
of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989),
Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940 – 1960, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar
Detroit, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), & David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy &
White Racial Politics in Suburban America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

2

Harlem in New York City for his examination of the housing situation that Black people faced
when they chose to settle in this location. In the late 1800s, Harlem became Manhattan’s first
suburb, transforming from a shantytown to a modern urban center filled with transportation,
lighting, and contemporary sanitation facilities. Land was cheap and residents and contractors
had high hopes for the area. In areas of Harlem that did not become part of this initial wave of
development, Europeans and Black Southerners settled.3
While Black individuals and families traditionally lived in the less attractive
neighborhoods on the outskirts of residential areas, affluent Black people pushed for integration
into the more prosperous areas. With the continued influx of Black people from the South,
housing space was in high demand. Because of the predominant social perception of migrating
Black people, many white residents, including those European immigrants that generally lived in
the same areas as Black individuals and families, did not want to live in close proximity to this
incoming Black population. Consequently, a massive exodus of people occurred, opening up
residential space for Black people to settle.4
Osofsky finds that due to the high rents landlords charged Black tenants, Harlem was
transformed, once again, from an area of prosperity to an area containing slum-like conditions.
The “slum-like” conditions Osofsky references include, but are not limited to, the overcrowding
of housing due to the accommodation of lodgers, inability to keep up with sanitation, lack of
attention towards physical housing needs, and higher rates of death from diseases. These
conditions forced the decline of Harlem and thrust Black residents into unstable and unhealthy
living conditions, stifling their ability to become independent. To combat some of these
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Osofsky, Harlem, 75.
Ibid., 9 & 109.
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conditions, Osofsky discusses the creation of social service agencies in Harlem, and the entire
state of New York, to aid Black residents in their escape from the cycle of instability.5
While Osofsky recognizes the negative impacts that certain conditions, such as those
present in Harlem, had on Black bodies, what he fails to emphasize and discuss in depth are the
implications of race relations on Black people as both individuals and as entire communities.
Osofsky continues to perpetuate the dominant view of white scholars: Black people had control
over their immediate environments and slums were created because of Black resident’s lack of
desire, not because of systemic racialized practices. In addition, his discussion of the creation of
social service agencies to aid Black people in escaping the “cycle of instability” perpetuates the
conversation regarding the incapability of Black people to help themselves. It also emphasizes
the need for larger societal interventions when, in fact, the environments of Black residents were
created by those in power, mainly white individuals.
James R. Grossman focuses on the main reasons behind the migration of Black
Southerners to Chicago - increased independence and to escape racial oppression they continued
to experience - through the eyes of the migrants themselves. To Black Southerners, Chicago
represented stable employment, higher compensation, freedom from racial criticisms, and good
schools for children.6 Journeys to the North were often fraught with legal and social
ramifications for Black people attempting to leave the South. Many Southern Black residents
were fearful of white violence, social ridicule, and the unknown of leaving their Southern roots.
These reservations caused many Black people to stay in the South, appeasing the whites that
sought to keep them there.7 In an attempt to put the claims of Southern whites to rest, many
Black migrants reached out to Chicago social service agencies, churches, and employers for
5

Ibid., 135-136.
Grossman, Land of Hope, 16-17.
7
Ibid., 22-23 & 99.
6
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financial resources and the guarantee of employment opportunities upon arrival. Although there
were organizations in Chicago designed to help migrants find employment and housing, racism
still existed within these sectors.8
While Osofsky chose to focus on Harlem’s housing, Grossman looks at the racial
tensions that Black people experienced in Chicago’s employment sector, particularly when Black
workers were used as strikebreakers, or temporary employees, and when Black workers refused
to join unions. Each of these situations created and exacerbated tensions between white and
Black workers portraying Black employees as “usurpers” of white jobs during strike times and
outsiders when refusing to join unions. In addition to the negative perceptions that Black workers
faced in Chicago, they encountered ongoing job and financial insecurity, which, in turn,
prompted the creation of social service programs, as discussed in Osofsky’s work.9
By using the viewpoint of the Black migrant in this work, Grossman is able to integrate a
discussion of personal perceptions of the process of migration into a conversation about the
hardships faced upon arrival in Chicago. Grossman is also able to discuss the incorporation of
grassroots organizing through structured aid given to new Black migrants in order to combat
some of the negative racial ideologies faced in Chicago. He also suggests that, while there were
hurdles to jump over, Black migrants played a more active role in their decisions to leave the
South, which relied heavily on the transference of information from the North to the South.
Grossman’s discussion begins to make the move from Black residents in the North being
depicted as passive actors in a larger urban evolutionary story to active participants in collective
social and economic decisions that affected the Black community in the years that followed the
Great Migration.

8
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Ibid., 116.
Ibid., 170-174, 210 & 221.
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Both Osofsky and Grossman look at the Black urban experience through the lens of the
Great Migration and the years surrounding that particular movement of bodies. Other scholars
focus on the Black urban experience in post-industrial cities in the years that followed the Great
Depression and the end of World War II (WWII). Arnold R. Hirsch does so in his work Making
the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940 – 1960 as does Thomas J. Sugrue in his
work The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit.
Many scholars assume that racial ideologies manifested through the ghetto were fixed
and unchanging. Arnold R. Hirsch, however, through his exploration of Chicago, concluded that
ideas and perceptions of the ghetto and its inhabitants are constantly being “renewed, reinforced,
and reshaped.”10 He argues that ideologies and perceptions of the ghetto and its Black inhabitants
are formed by white citizens and expressed through legislative and municipal regulation,
yielding a racially segregated city. Instead of focusing on actions that Black residents took to
create their communities, Hirsch focuses on the white population of Chicago and argues that it
was this particular population that enabled the creation of Chicago’s “second ghetto” by
maintaining and perpetuating racial segregation.11
White residents largely opposed urban renewal plans that included the construction of
low-income housing in white neighborhoods because they saw incoming Black residents as a
threat. Consequently, plans were stalled and displaced Black residents were relocated to already
existing Black communities where living conditions were no better than the communities they
left.12 Some areas predominately occupied by Black residents were “reclaimed” by whites for
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Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, xii.
Ibid., 23-39.
12
Ibid., 136-137.
11
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middle-class residential neighborhoods. These actions effectively reinforced residential
segregation and white self-interest.13
While much of Hirsch’s argument is novel and adds to the discussion of the effects of
white people exerting power over the Black population in a crucial way, he focuses so
extensively on the power of white people over Black residents that personal accounts of Black
resistance get lost. Hirsch’s exploration only allows for a piece of Chicago’s physical and
demographic structure to be explored, thus, giving white people in power additional influence by
erasing particular chunks of this time period.
Thomas J. Sugrue focuses his research on post-WWII Detroit and suggests that
accumulating circumstances, such as white flight and deindustrialization, were the causes of
negative racial tensions in central cities. This viewpoint strays from popular discussion of the
time that conversely sees these as outcomes of racial tensions. As many scholars suggest, Black
individuals and families disproportionately suffered the negative consequences of economic
decline following the end of both World War I (WWI) and WWII. In terms of housing in Detroit,
Black residents suffered at the hands of whites through the use of violence, intimidation, and
legislation that continued to force them into dilapidated, crowded, and unsafe neighborhoods.14
Sugrue discusses some tactics used by Black residents to ensure the manageable
expansion of their neighborhoods and communities, but recognizes that many white homeowners
saw these tactics as threats to their own stability. Accordingly, racially discriminatory practices,
such as redlining and the creation of semi-political activist groups like Neighborhood
Improvement Associations, were utilized to keep Black persons out of white neighborhoods.

13
14

Ibid., 157-160.
Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 4-8.
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Sugrue finds that urban decline was ultimately a perfect storm resulting from economic and
political decisions made on multiple levels, including institutions, groups, and individuals.15
Sugrue points to the fact that the urban crises of the 1960s, such as deindustrialization
and white flight, were evident in central cities during preceding decades. He highlights Black-led
organizations that fought against the seemingly resolute situations into which Black residents
were thrust and environments in which they were contained. Sugrue also finds a way to integrate
many aspects of the Black urban experience into this work while taking the Black perspective
into account, which had been largely missing from prior scholarly pieces.
Using Sugrue as a jumping off point, David M.P. Freund continues the exploration of
race relations in terms of economics and politics, focusing on housing in Detroit. He centers on
two main ideas throughout this book: the definition of race is constantly evolving and the ways
in which racism is manifested are also continuously changing. Whites in the 1960s were
preoccupied with homeownership, property, and neighborhoods, which affected the ways in
which they viewed Black people. Freund suggests that racism of the 1960s was not based on
physical differences, but rather the notion that Black people “posed a threat to communities of
white property owners.”16 Freund states that this particular manifestation of racism was fueled by
governmental decisions that created residential segregation, in the form of suburbs, and
perpetuated the perception that inequality was merely a manifestation of market forces.17
As in Hirsch and Sugrue’s books, Freund points to tactics that were used and
implemented by governmental entities to ensure that residential and racial segregation were
preserved while absolving themselves of any racist burdens associated with these practices. Not
only was the government absolved of the accusation of being racist, but white homeowners could
15

Ibid., 11, 38 & 214-215.
Freund, Colored Property, 12.
17
Ibid., 9.
16
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be as well because apparently neutral market forces, not personal attitudes or beliefs, explained
any changes within the city. By using the entity of “the market,” whites were able to, once again,
deny the existence of racism in certain practices while also denying the concept of white
privilege in the housing market.18 The discussion of property from this particular lens adds to
previous conversations of residential segregation in post-war cities by concentrating on specific
tactics used by the government and citizens, particularly white citizens, to justify certain actions.
However, what is missing is the presence of Black voices and their experiences and
interpretations of the housing market, legislative tactics, and, ultimately, residential segregation
in the City and suburbs of Detroit.
Gilbert Osofsky, James R. Grossman, Arnold R. Hirsch, Thomas J. Sugrue, and David
M.P. Freund lay out many aspects of the Black urban experience upon settlement in Northern
cities that had a profound impact on their daily lives. What can be further explored, however, are
the actions and structural forces that created a Black sense of place and the physical effects that
these experiences had on Black bodies. Katherine McKittrick seeks to fill that void in her article
“On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place.” Her research suggests that the ways in
which Black communities are spatially configured are intertwined with “practices of domination
and deliberate attempts to destroy a Black sense of place.”19 McKittrick points to the history of
Black persons in America and the structural constructions of what it means to be labeled as
Black, which equates to being a body “without.” Through this perception, Black bodies are seen
as being incapable of having certain rights, whether that is rights to land, rights to freedom, or
rights to social inclusion. These lacks of rights form the ideas behind the fluctuating definition of

18

Ibid., 37, 207 & 249.
Katherine McKittrick, “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place,” Social and Cultural Geography,
12(8), December 2011, 947.
19
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racism, the creation of specified places for Black cultures, and the structural denial of a place for
Black people within the larger United States society.20
Time and time again, policies have been put into place to erase the rich history and
culture of America’s Black population, whether it is during the times of slavery and plantations
or through the continual imprisonment of Black bodies.21 McKittrick also identifies instances of
urbicide as examples of the historical erasure of a Black sense of place. She defines urbicide as
“the deliberate death of the city and willful place annihilation” and suggests that Black
communities suffer disproportionately from urbicide by means of environmental, social, and
infrastructural decay.22 In this way, a Black sense of place is destroyed by the physical and
psychological destruction of the spaces that Black people have been forced to inhabit.23
One way in which the concept of urbicide is exemplified is through the historical
upheaval known as urban renewal. This mid-1900s movement was expressed as uneven
development in central cities, which solidified seemingly natural “links between [B]lackness,
underdevelopment, poverty, and place.”24 During this urban renewal time period, Black
communities, those “without,” were specifically targeted and, thus, urban renewal acts became
racialized and continued to shape the environments of Black people, facilitating the definition of
a Black sense of place. The perspective of McKittrick is crucial to the conversations surrounding
urban renewal efforts of the past, present, and future as it calls for a reformation of our current
knowledge of systems that affect Black people.25 The concept of urbicide can aid scholars in this

20

Ibid., 948-949.
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Ibid., 951.
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reformation when looking at how cities came to produce their current physical structure and how
decisions of the past have placed and forced Black people into their current situations.
Mindy Thompson Fullilove delves into the psychological effects of urbicide surrounding
the urban renewal years in her book Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts
America, and What We Can Do About It. As a psychiatrist, Fullilove attempted to conceive of a
term that would fully capture and portray the emotional pain that accompanies displacement
from the point of view of those who directly experience it. It is through the exploration of the
personal histories of those displaced, predominantly because of urban renewal projects, that she
coins the concept of “root shock.”26 Fullilove broadly defines root shock as “the traumatic stress
reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s emotional ecosystem.”27 While this particular
terminology is quite general, she breaks this concept up into multiple “levels” so that the reader
can fully grasp the concept and the magnitude of root shock.
Fullilove begins with the level of the individual, stating that root shock manifests itself as
“a profound emotional upheaval that destroys the working model of the world that had existed in
the individual’s head… [which] undermines trust, increases anxiety about letting loved ones out
of one’s sight, destabilizes relationships, destroys social, emotional, and financial resources, and
increases the risk for every kind of stress-related disease…”28 At the community level, root
shock physically destroys neighborhoods and the bonds created in neighborhood settings.
Fullilove notes that community level root shock spreads out among members of the destroyed
community to other areas of a social or geographic space; even if areas are recreated with the
same individuals, the negative effects of the initial upheaval are irreparable. She also notes that it

26

Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America and What We Can
Do About It (New York: Ballatine, 2004), 3.
27
Ibid., 11.
28
Ibid., 14.
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is not only those directly affected by events that lead to root shock, but rather, entire societies
and future generations are affected.29 Without looking at the social, economic, cultural, political,
and emotional losses of Black America, the overall impacts of urban renewal efforts cannot be
fully understood.30
This thesis research project engages with many of the concepts introduced and explored
by Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, Freund, McKittrick, and Fullilove while focusing on the
City of Milwaukee, the Black community centered around Walnut Street, and the activism that
residents exhibited in the face of the urban renewal destruction. The concepts that each of these
scholars engage with informed the initial research for Chapter One of this work, guiding further
examination of specific institutions on multiple scales directly related to the housing market and
its influence on Black mobility and a Black sense of place. On a national level, institutions such
as the HOLC, the FHLBB, and the federal government itself, adopted practices that directly
contributed to the continued segregation present in the housing market. Similarly, on a local
level, city governments and area residents collaborated to guarantee the continued confinement
of Black populations. This research mirrors some of the discussion of what took place in Harlem,
Chicago, and Detroit, participating in a conversation with Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue,
Freund, McKittrick, and Fullilove’s research. However, it also takes several pieces of their
scholarship a step further to include the Black voice, Black experiences, and Black activism
present in the City of Milwaukee.
History specific to the City of Milwaukee was pulled from geographer John Gurda’s
book The Making of Milwaukee, historian Joe William Trotter, Jr.’s book Black Milwaukee: The
Making of an Industrial Proletariat 1915-45, historian Patrick Jones’s book The Selma of the

29
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Ibid., 12-16.
Ibid., 20.
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North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee, and historian Paul Geib’s case study “From
Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study of Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 19401970.” By utilizing these particular pieces of work, specifics to the City of Milwaukee were
analyzed and reorganized to articulate the experiences of Black individuals and families in the
contexts of migration, employment, housing, governmental actions, and urban renewal efforts.
These pieces of scholarship were crucial in incorporating facts and figures into the larger
conversation of the Black urban experience. In much the same way, archival materials from the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Public Library were utilized to capture
the narrative of Milwaukee’s urban renewal efforts from the view of those who were directly
involved in community activism and the preservation of a Black sense of place.
It is important for scholars, researchers, academics, and everyday citizens to see the
complete picture of the ways in which past events have impacted the entirety of society. This
view allows us to engage with the full story of events from multiple perspectives, removing
stigmas from certain portions of the population and minimizing unfair advantages. A complete
picture ensures that similar mistakes will not be re-made and that advances are made for the good
of the many, not the good of the few. The uncovering of complete histories can impact future
legislation and ensure that decision makers and voters are engaging with legislation geared
towards the good of the many, not the good of the few. We should always be working towards
creating a scholarship of truth, which is why events of the distant past are continually being
revisited.
Through the use of Milwaukee’s Walnut Street and the communities created around it,
this thesis research project argues that despite popular perception, Black citizens were not idle in
the instances when urban renewal projects threated to displace their community members,
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destroy cultural districts, and erase the histories of entire areas and entire groups of people.
Instead, under the direction of local residents, neighborhood citizens, community organizations,
and decision makers were engaged in actions that impacted the direct environment in ways
deemed acceptable to those directly affected. This conversation and exploration will contribute
to the creation of a complete history of the Black urban experience in Milwaukee and has the
potential to lead futures scholars to explore the experiences, particularly in terms of grassroots
and community led activism, of other Black communities throughout the United States.

From South to North: The Great Migration
The Great Migration of Black people from the Southern United States constitutes a
period of time from 1910 to 1960 when over six million Black people left the South in search of
new employment opportunities and a better life for themselves and their families.31 The North
offered higher employment wages and an escape from Southern sharecropping, social rejection,
and violence for Black people.32As James R. Grossman discusses in his investigation of the
Great Migration in Chicago, many white residents sympathized with migrating Southern Blacks,
but ultimately viewed them as “ignorant, degraded, and helpless refugees.”33 The burden of
adaptation or adjustment to the accepted way of life, directed by white individuals and
institutions, was placed solely on Black migrants. Pieces of Black culture that did not fit into the
“norm” of Northern life were looked at unfavorably and led to the snubbing of newly arriving
Black migrants.34 The Chicago Defender, a newspaper published by Black Chicago residents, put
together a list of “do’s and don’t’s” to inform readers of acceptable and unacceptable
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behaviors.35 This fear of social rejection and the subsequent creation of a set of guidelines can be
seen as a negation of the escape from social rejection Black people faced in the South. However,
this was often not revealed until Black people had already put down roots in Northern cities and
did not necessarily slow the influx of Black migrants. Although the Great Migration took place
over the course of fifty years, a large majority of migrants left their Southern roots during the
years surrounding WWI and WWII.
Due to the passing of federal migration quota laws, the immigration of Europeans to the
United States slowed from over one million in 1914 to fewer than 150,000 in 1925.36 This
decrease in the number of European immigrants created an opportunity for migrating Black
people to become employed as laborers in Northern cities. With the onset of both WWI and
WWII, the demand for war related goods, such as uniforms, bomb materials, and vehicles, and
laborers increased exponentially.37 While the bulk of Southern migrants settled in large cities like
New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, others chose smaller, but still heavily manufacturing
based cities as Milwaukee.38
Milwaukee became a logical site for the importing and exporting of goods because of its
proximity to both railway lines and waterways. Breweries, flour mills, tanneries, and industrial
manufacturing companies established themselves in Milwaukee during the first half of the 20th
century, creating a pool of employment opportunities for Southern Black people.39 From 1910 to
1930, the Black population in Milwaukee grew from 980 to 7,501 and from 1950 to 1970, the
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Black population increased from 21,772 to 105,088.40 Table 1 exhibits the tremendous growth of
Milwaukee’s Black population from the 1930s through the 1970s.
Table 1. Black Population Growth in the City of Milwaukee, 1930-1970

Source: United States Census Population, 1930-1970. (Paul E. Geib, “The Late
Great Migration: A Case Study of Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee,
1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History, 83(4) 1998, 231.

Black Employment
Largely employed in agricultural sectors and as domestic servants in the South, many
Black people had to transition to different forms of work, gaining skills in the rapidly growing
manufacturing sector with companies like Allis-Chalmers, Bucyris-Erie, A.O. Smith, and
Harley-Davidson.41 These companies specialized in the production of engines, generators, steam
shovels, water heaters, and motorcycles.42 Labor agents roamed Southern cities in search of
workers for these growing companies, increasing the Black workforce in industrial jobs to 80
percent by the 1930s.43
Milwaukee became a powerhouse of manufacturing materials for the war effort. Utilizing
already established companies, such as Allis-Chalmers and Harley-Davidson, goods were
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produced for the Allied forces.44 Plant expansion accounted for $270 million of federal monies to
keep up with demands; this expansion augmented the need for laborers and, with many white
males enlisted in the armed forces, increased the demand for Black workers.45 Paired with
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1941 Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) that prohibited
racial discrimination in defense industries, a road was paved for Black employment in
Milwaukee. The skills that Southern Black people procured through previous employment as
sharecroppers, day laborers, grocery store workers, and the few opportunities open to them in
manufacturing positions served them well in the North. 46
Some Northern employers, however, took advantage of the perceived conditions of Black
employment in the South. Many employers were under the impression that because these newly
arrived migrants came from Southern states, they had an exceptional ability to work in the heat
and, thus, were hired on to work in positions that were “hot, dirty, and low-paying.”47 As an
example, the A.O. Smith Corporation became a large producer of bombs during the war. Because
of the nature of bomb-making, A.O. Smith laborers were forced to work in an environment that
exceeded 105 degrees Fahrenheit and was extremely loud. Mississippi sharecroppers were
recruited for these positions based on the belief that they could handle the heat and noise. This
recruitment shifted the demographics of A.O. Smith employees to over 80 percent identifying as
Black.48 Other companies hired Black people for the most undesirable positions, such as
removing hair from hides at local tanneries, or as janitors, porters, and common laborers.
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Promotions for Black laborers were also difficult to come by. Locally based Allis-Chalmers was
known for denying promotions to skilled Black laborers based solely on race.49
Although many Milwaukee employers practiced some forms of racism in the workplace,
the labor shortage in more desirable positions could not be denied and Milwaukee employers
began to hire Black laborers more and more frequently. In 1943, a representative of the
Milwaukee Urban League (MUL) stated, “For the first time in over a decade Negro labor was
actually sought by heavy industry. Today there is hardly a Negro man in Milwaukee who is
physically able and willing to work who is not employed.”50 Through the war years, Black
people continued to be employed by the industrial and manufacturing firms of Milwaukee and
worked their way up to higher positions in companies like A.O. Smith and American Motors.51
Following the end of WWII, the demand for war supplies declined and many Milwaukee
based manufacturing companies were crippled. Coupled with this decline, the job market became
saturated with returning veterans; consequently, Black laborers were no longer in high demand
and were often fired to accommodate returning veterans, creating very unstable financial
environments for families that relied on this income.52 By the 1960s, Black male unemployment
figures hovered around 10 percent.53 From the end of the 1960s continuing into the early 1970s,
Milwaukee saw over seventy-six companies close completely, leaving over 16,000 workers,
Black and white, without a job.54 With mounting pressure from federal entities, Black people
were invited into segments of the labor force that were not traditionally open to them. They were
encouraged to apply to become brewery workers, nurses, salespeople, and trolley drivers.55
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Even with the rise of Black workers in these unconventional fields, many businesses left
the central city to create roots in suburbs and outlying areas. From 1960 to 1970, Milwaukee jobs
located in the central city declined by over 10 percent as jobs outside of the city increased by
over 75 percent.56 With limited access to personal vehicles and without public transportation
lines extended to these areas, unemployment rates among Black residents increased even further.
As in Grossman’s discussion of neighboring Chicago, each of these occurrences added to the
tumultuous financial condition of Milwaukee’s Black residents in achieving independence from
larger societal ties.

Black Housing and the Creation of the Inner City
Immigrant populations seeking to create their own sense of place in a new area settled
into Milwaukee’s neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were often made up of several square
blocks, which allowed for the maintenance of culture and solidarity and became a source of
pride. Milwaukee’s inner city was initially inhabited by German, Jewish, Greek, Slovak, and
Croatian immigrants.57 As the Black population continued to rise, they inherited “hand-me-down
neighborhoods left behind as early residents moved out to greener pastures.”58 As in Osofsky’s
exploration of Harlem, Milwaukee’s immigrant groups left in massive numbers as the influx of
Black people continued to increase, further opening up this central city area for Black settlement.
Although this choice in location may seem to be purely that, a choice, other factors influenced
where Black people were able to live within the city. Structural racism, which manifests itself in
redlining, housing discrimination, labor market discrimination, and social perceptions of race,
along with the subsequent deindustrialization of Milwaukee all had significant influences over
56
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the neighborhoods and areas in which Black people were able to live. In addition, as James R.
Grossman suggests, the desire of Black residents to avoid white prejudices combined with
aspirations to retain cultural customs impelled Black residents into particular neighborhoods.59
While these influences created an environment that generally appeased Milwaukee’s
white population, Black residents came together to influence the spaces they were forced into to
benefit their community as a whole. Black people established businesses, bought homes, created
carpools and walking routes to work, and enjoyed a rich culture in the spaces into which they
were forced and, ultimately, confined. Neighborhoods throughout the United States that were
transforming to be predominately Black were given nicknames such as “Coontown,” “Nigger
Alley,” Nigger Row,” “The Black Belt,” and “Darktown,” to further designate them as areas
reserved for Black residents.60 Figure 1 shows the increase in the Black population in
Milwaukee’s central city from the 1940s to the 1960s and the areas to which they were
contained.
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Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of the Nonwhite Population of Milwaukee in 1940, 1950, and
1960. Source: Unknown article title and author, Milwaukee Sentinel, February 8, 1967, Folder 29, Box 2,
Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records 1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Archives.

Milwaukee historian John Gurda suggests, “[w]here the races met, the encounter quickly
assumed the oil-and-water character that typified the urban North.”61 White residents did not
easily understand Black culture and their “way of life” was seen as something unpleasant,
tainting relationships between neighbors and resulting heavily in white flight to the suburbs of
Milwaukee.62 These perceptions were fueled by the dialogue surrounding the influx of Black
individuals and families and what effects they would have on surrounding areas. Many left the
central city to escape perceived declining property values, increasing crime rates, blight, slum
areas, and a failing educational system.63
Most prominently, real estate workers and housing reformers perpetuated ideologies
suggesting that there was an emerging Black ghetto that was a “pathological, dangerous and
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nefarious place, to be avoided by whites and other ethnic groups.”64 Large organizations, such as
the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), published printed materials for
distribution, warning realtors of the threats minorities posed and pushed the idea that only
homogenized neighborhoods were stable and desirable. As early as the mid-1920s, real estate
boards in Milwaukee approved measures to encourage the maintenance of racial segregation.65
Just to the south of Milwaukee, the Chicago Real Estate Board suggested similar housing
segregation ordinances and petitioned the Chicago City Council to prohibit “further migration of
‘colored families’ to Chicago until such time as the city could work out ‘reasonable restrictions’
to ‘prevent lawlessness, destruction of values and property and loss of life.’”66 On a national
scale, the NAREB officially incorporated legal discrimination into its code of ethics by stating
that realtors “should never be instrumental in introducing… members of any race or
nationality… whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in the
neighborhood.”67
White flight and dominant perceptions of the inner city caused a large amount of homes
to be left vacant. In response, these homes were often sold at low prices and converted into
multi-family dwellings with rooming houses for boarders; other dwellings were transformed into
rental properties or sold to loan associations, realtors, and slum investors. These loan
associations, realtors, and investors then practiced discriminatory procedures, such as restrictive
housing covenants and redlining, using the language described above, to keep Black people
contained to certain areas of the city.68
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Racially restrictive housing covenants were “contractual agreements between property
owners and neighborhood associations that prohibited the sale, occupancy or lease of property
and land to certain racial groups, especially [B]lacks.”69 These housing covenants were often put
into place in newly developing subdivisions or suburbs, but were also used within the city to
negatively impact the mobility of Black people during the early half of the 20th century.70
Redlining is defined as, “the avoidance and/or withdrawal of financial investments in some urban
areas and the concentration in other urban or suburban areas.”71 Banks, savings and loan
organizations, and insurance institutions have been charged with utilizing redlining tactics to
keep Black homeownership rates down and to disinvest in neighborhoods deemed undesirable,
subsequently making homeownership less attainable.72
One tactic linked to redlining was the creation of “Residential Security Maps” by the
Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB).
These maps were created in 239 different cities, including Milwaukee, to appraise real estate risk
levels with each section of the city being assigned a grade. Each grade corresponded with a
color, first grade (A) represented by green, second grade (B) represented by blue, third grade (C)
represented by yellow, and fourth grade (D) represented by red, hence the term redlining. Figure
2 displays the coloration designation legend from a Residential Security Map of Milwaukee from
1938.
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Figure 2: 1938 Milwaukee Residential Security Map Coloration Designations.
Source: Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: Residential Security Map, United States
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1938, University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee American Geographical Society Library Digital Map
Collection.

Coloration determination was based on the “age of [area] buildings, their condition, the
amenities and infrastructure in the neighborhood… the level of racial, ethnic, and economic
homogeneity, [and] the absence or presence of ‘a lower grade population,’” in most cases, Black
individuals and families.73 Additionally, those areas rated third (C), or yellow, and fourth (D), or
red, contained residents who were unlikely to receive mortgage approval or home loans for the
purchasing of properties, even if properties they were interested in purchasing were outside of
73
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the areas in which the resident currently resided. Similarly, those interested in developing land or
properties contained within the third (C) or fourth (D) grade were often denied the financial
backing for construction projects. As a result, Residential Security Maps were highly effective in
creating further racial segregation and exacerbating the decline of certain sections of the city.74
Figure 3 displays the entire 1938 Residential Security Map of Milwaukee, clearly indicating a
fourth (D) grade for the section of the municipality known of as the inner city.
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Figure 3: 1938 Residential Security Map with Inner City Demarcation. Adapted
from: Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: Residential Security Map, United States
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1938, University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee American Geographical Society Library Digital Map
Collection.
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As David M.P. Freund discusses, Residential Security Maps represented a “fundamental
transformation in the way that whites’ racial preferences shaped the [housing] market.”75 By
utilizing large organizations, such as the HOLC and the FHLBB, the desires of white citizens
were expressed through state-regulated and state-funded systems that directly influenced how
people bought homes, who was able to purchase homes, and what sections of the city homes
could be purchased. These organizations, in turn, were able to manipulate the conversation
regarding racial discrimination and exclusion in the housing market from that of a segregationist
ideology to a product of economics.76 The actions of the HOLC and FHLBB continued to fuel
negative views of Milwaukee’s Black population by creating racially segregated conditions in
order to perpetuate the dominant perception of the Black populace manifested through white
ideologies.
The inclusion of these types of policies coincided with a change in the discussion of race
and place. The presence of Black bodies in certain areas was now connected with the physical
deterioration of neighborhoods, rising crime rates, and many other negative attributes through the
use of specific jargon.77 Central cities were now being referred to as the “inner city” or as
“slums” based on the presence of a condition coined “blight.” The definitions of these terms
were plagued with negative connotations and were thrust upon the Black community with little
hesitation. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the terms “inner city,” “slum,” and “blight”
in the following ways:
Inner City: “the central section of a large city where mostly poor people live”78
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Slum: “an area of a city where poor people live and the buildings are in bad condition” or
“a very untidy place”79
Blight: “something that causes harm or damage like a disease” or “a damaged
condition”80
What is interesting to note is that the term “blight” can be said to have the ability to take on two
different implications: the blight of people and the blight of physical structures.81 The use of
these terms in everyday discourse directly contributed to the perceived conditions of these
labeled sections of the city and the people who lived in them, primarily Black residents.
At the time that this shift in discourse was occurring, roughly 2 percent of Black people
owned their own homes while the remaining 98 percent were forced to rent from landlords.82
Studies have concluded that the 2 percent of Black people who did own homes often paid more
than the value of their homes when purchasing in Black neighborhoods.83 While these rates did
increase in the decades that followed, the percentage of Black homeowners pales in comparison
to that of white homeowners.84 In addition to the structural tactics used to specifically ban Black
people from homeownership, such as white real estate workers refusing to work with Black
clientele, restrictive housing covenants, and redlining, Thomas J. Sugrue points to the issue of
finances. Black individuals were faced with the reality that they were paid much less than their
white counterparts and were often the first to be let go in times of economic strife. In addition, a
large percentage of Black residents’ paychecks were devoted to overpriced rental options.85
Table 2 shows the percentage of Black homeowners versus white homeowners in the City of
Milwaukee from the 1940s through the 1980s.
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Table 2. Black Home Owners and White Home Owners for the City of Milwaukee, 19401980

Source: Paul E. Geib, “The Late Great Migration: A Case Study of Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 19401970,” The Journal of Negro History, 83(4) 1998, 241.

Accordingly, Milwaukee’s Black residents were forced to rent homes and to occupy the
spaces offered to them, creating a large demand for a small number of units in a specified area.
This, in turn, allowed landlords to raise rent anywhere from 30 percent to 200 percent, as they
knew Black people did not have many other housing choices. In Osofsky’s exploration of
Harlem, he found that Black residents paid, on average, $3 more per room, per month than their
white counterparts.86 Although specific figures for Milwaukee were not found, it can be assumed
that discrepancies between Black and white renters were comparable to those found in Harlem.
86
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Black renters often had to take in lodgers in order to pay this exorbitant rent, severely cramping
living quarters and creating an unsanitary environment.87
Milwaukee was also plagued with a large number of absentee landlords who, once they
rented their aging structures to Black individuals and families, stopped paying attention to their
properties based on the undesirable locations and the color of the renter’s skin. This fact only
contributed to the decline in the physical features of the property and the market value of homes
that Black people were forced to live in. These dilapidating homes also affected the larger
aesthetic value of the neighborhood, causing other landlords to disinvest in and under-maintain
their properties.88 These racialized influences forced Black people “deeper and deeper into the
most dilapidated sections of the urban housing market.”89 In 1946, 67 percent of Milwaukee’s
Black population lived in homes that were seen as unfit or largely dilapidated.90
By the 1960s, the inner city expanded to six times the size of the area it covered in the
1950s.91 Conditions within the inner city rapidly declined as the housing stock continued to age,
resources became more and more scarce, and poverty increased. Addressing these issues would
quickly become controversial and thoroughly debated at the expense of Milwaukee’s Black
community.

Milwaukee’s Urban Renewal
White flight in the housing market coalesced with deindustrialization during the midtwentieth century to trigger a significant loss in Milwaukee’s central city tax base. This loss
directly caused the decline of funding for social services and public schools, impacting crime
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rates and increasing the number of boarded up homes and vacant lots.92 A 1939 survey
conducted by Works Progress Administration found that only 7 percent of the homes contained
in Milwaukee’s inner city were in good physical condition, while more than 75 percent were
considered substandard.93 This deterioration of the central business district and surrounding
residential neighborhoods was not unique to Milwaukee. Cities across the United States were
feeling the effects of the culmination of WWII and the abandonment of the central city by
businesses and white citizens. By the late 1940s, governmental entities, both local and federal,
were forced to take action.
Milwaukee’s local response came in the form of the 1948 Corporation, later known as the
Greater Milwaukee Committee. This group was formed as a non-partisan, non-political, nonsectional group aimed at community improvement, particularly through the construction of
“quality of life projects” such as a sports arena, a professional baseball stadium, libraries, and
museums.94 On a larger scale, the federal government ratified Title I of the Housing Act in 1949,
which encouraged central cities and central business districts to engage in the revitalization of
“decaying” urban areas. More widely known as urban renewal, this program caught the eyes of
city planners, mayors, social welfare leaders, journalists, private business owners, and the
general public who saw this program as an opportunity to restore cities to their former glory.95
While each of these groups and individuals imagined urban renewal projects differently, initial
thoughts surrounding urban renewal suggested that these efforts would be effective in “clear[ing]
and rehabilitat[ing] ‘slums’ and ‘blight’ and [would] build new modern housing, commercial,
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and institutional complexes in postwar central cities” utilizing federal funds.96 These efforts were
seen as a means to increase central city property values and tax revenues, to create better living
conditions for the poor, and to help cities become more economically viable.97 As Arnold R.
Hirsch and David M. P. Freund suggest, the increased involvement of the government reinforced
racial segregation and allowed it to become a permanent part of city life. Prior to formalized
legislation targeting slums and blight in central cities, agreements amongst realtors and
landlords, restrictive housing covenants, and redlining were the most influential forces in
determining the residential patterns of Black community members. As governmental entities put
urban renewal legislation into place and shaped public policies regarding redevelopment, the
interests of private supporters trumped moral obligations to “voiceless” central city residents,
mainly low-income Black residents. 98 Thus, while the romanticism of urban renewal projects
lasted through the first few years, these ulterior motives were soon uncovered and it was
discovered that these projects sought to continue to intentionally destroy a Black sense of place
and perpetuate racial segregation and discrimination.
As with discourse regarding the inner city, terminology included in urban renewal
legislation was fraught with powerful meanings. In addition to the inclusion of the term blight
and slum, renewal is defined as “the state of being made new, fresh, or strong.”99 This term
suggests that the areas slated for urban renewal projects were dead or in the process of dying,
which heavily influenced the standards created by federal and local officials in order to create a
“healthy” city. Local leaders used the amount of perceived blight present to determine which
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neighborhoods to demolish in the name of renewal efforts. Thus, blight became the “primary
justification for creative destruction.”100
The term creative destruction has been used in various contexts to explore many facets of
the economy, particularly when discussing properties of capitalism. Rachel Weber, Urban
Planning and Policy Professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago, refers to this creative
destruction in her article “Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban
Redevelopment.” She cites the desire of local municipalities to dispose of degraded properties, or
blight, to make way for new investment opportunities. These projects were put in place without
regard to the people, places, and businesses that were directly affected. Ordinances and statues
were crafted to intentionally define blight in vague ways so that essentially any reason for the
destruction of a building or property was justified.101 Planners from the American Public Health
Association justified decisions by referencing specific characteristics, such as the age of
buildings, population gain and loss, structural deterioration, and health statistics, to determine
what blight was and where it was happening. Other urban reformers also cited the “high
correlation between poverty and congestion… and disease and death.”102
Using these techniques, blight was often disproportionally found in areas that housed
non-white residents. The people that made these area-wide decisions were far removed from the
immediate environment and, thus, validated their decisions for destruction because of the
positive impacts renewal was supposed to have on the economic viability of the central city. In
this way, creative destruction was utilized to manipulate larger public perceptions of urban
renewal efforts while having the completely opposite effect on those that were directly impacted
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by these decisions.103 These tactics were put into place to justify urban renewal ventures in cities
throughout the United States, including Milwaukee.
Milwaukee Mayor Frank P. Zeidler was elected to office in 1948 on the platform that he
would not add any debt that would affect Milwaukee’s shining credit rating. However, he
quickly acknowledged that the problems of the inner city, including the withdrawal of
businesses, were too much for the City to handle on its own. While he initially borrowed
approximately $13 million in 1948, this amount quickly increased as project after project
suggested by the 1948 Corporation and other entities were approved in the name of urban
renewal. Large projects intended to bring visitors and their money back to the city were
completed, including a convention arena in 1950 and Milwaukee County Stadium in 1953.104 In
addition, in order to accommodate potential tourists and those residents living in outlying
suburbs, the State Highway Commission planned the first segments of a six-lane highway, the
Interstate 43 (I-43) expressway, and construction was begun in March of 1952.105 As was the
case in many cities experiencing large amounts of urban renewal construction, the creation of
interstates and highways coincided with the razing of large numbers of housing structures
deemed unfit. However, what these roadways were often used as were “handy devices for razing
slums,” as discussed in Thomas J. Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality
in Postwar Detroit. A 1950 Milwaukee Journal article called the North Side of Milwaukee a
“dilapidated, overcrowded tinder box.”106 In response, Mayor Zeidler ordered 10,000 housing
units to be torn down.107 By masking urban renewal projects as progressive approaches to central
city revitalization, larger issues, such as the displacement of thousands of individuals and
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families, were largely ignored. In addition, state highway commissions had no legal obligation to
assist displaced residents in finding alternative housing options.108 Instead, the housing that
remained became increasingly overcrowded and decrepit.
Many local state and real estate entities, such as the HOLC and the NAREB, continued to
push for the bulldozer approach to derelict housing, stating that rehabilitation would “only
perpetuate bad land patterns and provide no lasting solution” to urban blight.109 These entities
argued that by completely eliminating blighted structures and, in turn, blighted people, the
possibility of blight enduring in central cities would be lessened dramatically.110 It can be argued
that the opinions of these entities prevailed and bulldozers continued their reign of destruction.
Not surprisingly, these bulldozers meant an increase in Black people seeking out alternate
housing options and overcrowding already packed dwellings in Black neighborhoods throughout
the United States, Milwaukee being no exception.
As more and more residents became displaced due to these projects, negative sentiment
towards urban renewal gained steam. The federal government responded by passing the Housing
Act of 1954 that sought to switch the aims of legislation from renewal to redevelopment.
However, large projects requiring the extensive demolition of existing neighborhoods and
structures continued to dominate approved urban renewal “improvements.” A new terminal was
completed at Mitchell Field in 1955, the State Teachers College and the University Extension
were combined to create the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1956, and the War Memorial
and Milwaukee Art Center opened their doors in 1957. In addition to the construction of the I-43
expressway that was already taking place, the Park East Freeway was added to Milwaukee’s
transportation plans in 1958. Ground was broken for the construction of the Park East freeway
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and hundreds of homes and businesses along Fond du Lac Avenue were demolished.111 To fund
the continued expansion for these expressways, the City of Milwaukee solicited 90 percent of the
costs from the federal government.112 By 1956, Mayor Zeidler increased Milwaukee’s debt to
over $55 million.113
Although some saw these large projects as triumphs in the name of urban renewal, out of
the 10,000 units of unfit housing torn down, only one low-income housing project, Hillside
Terrace, was constructed to house displaced residents. The construction of Hillside Terrace, and
many other proposals throughout the United States, were met with heightened resistance from
one section of the public because of the population that they would be housing: displaced Black
individuals and families. Popular societal views of the time place Black people in a precarious
position. Black residents were essentially kicked out of their homes due to “increasing blight,”
the “improvement” of the downtown area, and the creation of an expressway for primarily white
users. At this same time, they were not provided with many other housing options as they were
barred from living in newly constructed buildings and properties and no additional public
housing was being created because of pressure from the larger community. Public housing
geared towards senior citizens and returning veterans, on the other hand, was met with little
outside opposition.114 Housing discrimination continued due to larger societal pushes to control
the housing options that Black residents had.
The absence of Black representation in the political realm further contributed to the
negative consequences of the choices made by those in power. By 1956, only one Black
individual held a political position of power in Milwaukee: Vel Phillips. Phillips was
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Milwaukee’s first female and first Black alderman on the Common Council and remained so for
the next twelve years.115 While Phillips attempted to uncover many of Milwaukee’s legislative
shortcomings in topics relevant to its Black population, white males she served with on the
Common Council often suppressed her ideas and her voice. Gradual political progress in terms
of Black representation and the Black voice, paired with white labor market domination and
discrimination in the housing market, continued to contribute to the difficult situation for
Milwaukee’s Black community. Consequently, urban renewal projects that had a negative impact
on primarily Black areas of the city continued.
After years of large projects focused on creating and expanding tourist attractions and
existing Milwaukee staples, Mayor Frank P. Zeidler committed himself to the clearance of slum
areas and the creation of public housing as “basic obligations of a civil society” and stressed that
a “city is greatest which cares best for its submerged people.”116 Instead of using blanket federal
solutions, Mayor Zeidler attempted to utilize local government entities, such as the Housing
Authority and the Common Council, to analyze neighborhoods and find local solutions to local
problems. Mayor Zeidler claimed that if inner city problems were increasing, the “entire
community shared the blame for its prolonged tolerance of wretched living conditions.”117 This
opinion was not widely shared, with many people in power taking the stance of “ignore [Black
people]… and maybe they’ll go away.”118
To explore the specific problems of Milwaukee’s inner city and to find potential
solutions, in 1959, Mayor Zeidler commissioned a study to focus on what he termed the “social
problems of the inner core.” This study explored many topics, including public welfare, problem
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families, education, community facilities and programs, housing, and law enforcement, while
noting that these topics and the problems uncovered were not entirely unique to Milwaukee.119
While the boundaries of the inner city changed over time, Zeidler’s study committee defined it as
Keefe Avenue to the north, Juneau Avenue to the south, the Milwaukee River and Holton Street
to the east, and Twentieth Street to the west.120 Figure 4 represents the designated boundaries of
Milwaukee’s inner city, as defined by Zeidler’s Study Committee.
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Figure 4: Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area
of the City Boundaries of the Inner City Map. Source: Mayor’s Study Committee
on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Final Report to the Honorable
Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of Milwaukee, April 15, 1960, Annex A.

In terms of housing, the final report lists several reasons why the housing stock in the
inner core was in a state of decline. These reasons include the devaluation of cleanliness and
orderliness of homes by Black residents, absentee ownership, zoning laws, over-occupancy and
overcrowding, real estate and mortgage discrimination practices, and the absence of private
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construction interest. 121 In order to combat these ills, the Subcommittee on Housing Conditions
and Availability suggested that the city create additional studies and reviews to determine
specifics related to zoning laws, the regulation of tenants versus landlord responsibilities,
property taxes, mortgage and real estate practices, and displacement due to urban renewal
projects. It also explicitly states “…housing segregation is the fundamental human relations
problem in [N]orthern urban communities. The pattern of housing segregation denies the Negro
his place in society. To deny him free access to housing of his choice is contrary to
democracy.”122 This study also recognizes that “facts and figures alone do not adequately
describe the problem of housing in the inner core area because it is affected by experiences and
attitudes” including both the attitudes of those who live in the “inner core” and those looking at
inner city residents from the outside.123 Those conducting this study were fully aware that
personal attitudes have an impact on problems in the inner city. However, the study itself
continues to contribute to these negative perceptions stating that “Negroes customarily put no
high prestige value on… mak[ing] cleanliness and orderliness of homes a matter of pride.”124 No
effort was made by this particular study to understand why this might be the case. Thus, through
this study, negative perceptions were perpetuated through the lack of a full understanding of the
immediate environment of Milwaukee’s Black residents.
This study commission praised Mayor Zeidler for his unique approach to clarifying and
seeking out solutions to area problems. Zeidler was also commended for utilizing 100 individuals
from various professions and backgrounds to undertake the many aspects of the study. Specific
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backgrounds and demographics of these professionals, however, are not available within the
study itself.125
Initially commissioned by Mayor Zeidler, this report was not finalized until his successor,
Henry W. Maier, took office in 1960. As such, many of the enlightening facts and suggestions
that were uncovered and discussed within the study were disregarded. Mayor Maier insisted that
Zeidler’s study findings were an undeniable “…mass of facts, figures, statistics, and bleak
reports.”126 Additionally, Maier did not share the same sentiments about local involvement in
social issues as his predecessor. Instead of attempting to utilize local entities to solve the city’s
problems and save money, he stressed that only through the engagement of the federal
government could Milwaukee save itself. Maier wanted to rely more heavily on federal monies
and federal legislation.127
Public and private development continued as Milwaukee gained the Marine Bank
headquarters in 1962, a new home for its Public Museum and County Zoo, both in 1962, and the
Mitchell Park Horticulture Domes between 1964 and 1967.128 The Interstate Highway System
continued to expand and over fifty-six additional miles were added to plans by 1967, bringing
the total construction mileage to just over eighty.129 To accommodate these additional miles,
14,219 homes were demolished, displacing innumerable individuals and families, over 50
percent of which were Black.130 Again, this position was not unique to Milwaukee. Nationwide,
the majority of neighborhoods demolished by urban renewal efforts housed the nation’s Black
population. Out of an estimated 2,500 neighborhoods razed by urban renewal efforts in 993 cities
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nationwide, 1,600 of them were Black communities.131 Thus, urban renewal became known as
“Negro removal” and came to symbolize the erasure of entire histories of the Black people that
inhabited these spaces.132
While he continued to ignore the need for public housing, Mayor Maier attempted to
establish a “blight line,” pushed for the construction of a luxury high-rise apartment complex
named Juneau Village, and authorized the demolition of entire square blocks around Marquette
University and Haymarket Square on the North Side for university expansion and industrial and
commercial redevelopment.133 As discussed in Hirsch’s investigation of post-WWII Chicago,
many of these projects can be viewed as reclamation of space for middle-class residents’
consumption instead of being used to restore spaces for those displaced by construction,
primarily poor Black residents.
Though some saw Milwaukee’s redevelopment projects as pitiful in comparison to other
large cities, residents complained the “city was going too far… reducing every project area to
rubble and then starting over from scratch” and that there was no input from those who were
directly affected.134 While there was a significant opposition movement brewing, it was eclipsed
by the push for school desegregation in the City of Milwaukee and throughout the nation.135 As
in cities nationwide, the creation and expansion of businesses, expressways, local social service
agencies, and arbitrary housing resolutions were only pieces of the revitalization puzzle in
Milwaukee.
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Though many of the same themes and arguments from existing scholarship concerning
post-WWII cities are similar to those found when looking at post-WWII Milwaukee, it is
important to look at cities individually as the manifestation of these themes and arguments can
be drastically different. Milwaukee’s Black population was impacted heavily by structural racism
in the form of restrictive housing covenants, redlining, housing discrimination, labor market
discrimination, and social perceptions of race. Each of these components impacted the areas of
Milwaukee in which Black people were permitted to live. As businesses and white central city
residents began migrating out of the downtown area into suburbs, Black residents were unable to
join, perpetuating racial segregation in housing. Thus, when federal urban renewal legislation
was passed and concentrated in areas of close proximity to the aging downtown area, Black
community members were disproportionately affected. The creation, and subsequent destruction,
of Black neighborhoods was not based on decisions of the Black people who resided there, but
rather were shaped by white ideologies contained in the foundation of housing related issues.
Central to Black housing in Milwaukee is the concept of urbicide, or the deliberate death
of the city. The portions of Milwaukee that were targeted for urban renewal projects were
considered as areas of heightened blight without truly investigating the assets that each area may
have contained. The general public began to accept the idea that blight was undesirable and
needed to be removed as quickly as possible. Therefore, Black neighborhoods became targets for
demolition just as much as the people that resided in them. Large construction projects that
consumed square blocks erased the histories of the demolished buildings themselves, but also the
histories of the people who settled and lived there. This deliberate destruction of physical
structures lends itself directly to a discussion of the deliberate destruction of history, especially
the history of Black inhabitants. Omitting low-income housing from the conversation, urban
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renewal projects were seemingly met with little resistance, as they generally did not affect those
who controlled the larger conversation, or those in power, mainly white individuals. Black
residents were seemingly left without an influential voice and the deliberate killing of their
neighborhoods, urbicide, continued and persistently influenced the Black sense of place in
Milwaukee.
Through the research conducted for Chapter One, it is clear that an extremely significant
element is missing from the conversation regarding the Black urban experience in Milwaukee:
the histories and personal experiences of Black residents. Excluding these voices, histories, and
narratives from the discussion of post-WWII Milwaukee and the city’s urban renewal projects
only adds to the popular perception that Black residents were inactive in matters that directly
affected their environments. It also continues to perpetuate the ideology that Black community
members did not care about their residences and neighborhoods. Even though much of the
current literature continues to disseminate this information by also excluding the experiences of
the Black resident, this thesis seeks to bring the narrative of Milwaukee’s Black population to the
forefront and disprove much of the discussion included in urban renewal literature portraying
Black residents as idle. I will do this by analyzing Milwaukee’s Walnut Street area from its
creation through the early 1980s.
Chapter Two focuses heavily on the creation of the vicinity known as Bronzeville and
attempts to give testament to sense of community pride contained within its borders. Although
this neighborhood was created through the forceful manipulation of Black bodies, it came to
represent something much larger. It signified the solidified creation of a Black sense of place in
the City of Milwaukee, a place where Black residents felt that they truly belonged. Bronzeville
residents were able to open their own businesses, become members of Black community
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organizations, and create a neighborhood identity of their own. Unfortunately, this community
was literally torn in two by the construction of Milwaukee’s interstate highway. Little regard was
given to the area, including the businesses and homes that were located there, or the Black bodies
that resided and conducted business there.
Chapter Three will continue to dispel widespread views about the Black community by
emphasizing the local activism undertaken by those who remained after Bronzeville was torn
apart. This activism will be highlighted using a discussion of the community organization named
the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO. WAICO leaders engaged with local
community members to reestablish a Black sense of place in a modified area and to support the
needs of individual residents. Although additional proposed urban renewal projects threatened to
displace even more of the area’s residents, WAICO fought against these initiatives to maintain
their place in Milwaukee as well as prove that Black residents had a voice, an opinion, and a
strong backing. As the support for WAICO projects increased, the organization took on the
creation of local low-income housing for residents that had been displaced by the continued
presence of bulldozers and groups determined to rid the city of blight and dilapidated structures.
While WAICO hit major roadblocks in their quest to create as many alternative housing options
for Black residents as they hoped, they were successful in producing a large number of units for
displaced community members.
It is through the exploration of these highly active communities surrounding Walnut
Street, both before and after Milwaukee’s interstate highway decimated their neighborhoods, that
a more complete history of the city’s Black residents can be uncovered and put into the contexts
in which they belong. This will guide and contribute to research that is still being conducted
regarding the Black urban experience in the years leading up to and surrounding urban renewal
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projects throughout the United States by shining the light on a primarily Black neighborhood that
took matters into their own hands to directly influence their environment.
The combination of Chapters Two and Three also bring an important feature to the
conversation regarding the Black urban experience: place matters. In terms of grassroots and
community led activism, the specific location, or place, in which these types of organizing occur
can have a significant impact on the success or failure of the effort. For example, if a group of
individuals attempt to create an organization based around community involvement in a place
where neighbors are far spread and the has been no history of community activism, that
particular group of people will have an extremely difficult time finding success. On the other
hand, if the groundwork has been laid for active community participation over several years and
community members are familiar with one another’s wants, needs, and desires, that same group
of people has a higher chance of becoming successful in their attempts. Thus, it can be said that
place has meaning and that place directly affects the type of organization that can be created as
well as the interventions and the strategies that can be effectively employed within the
organization.
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Chapter Two
Walnut Street: Milwaukee’s Bronzeville

While Chapter One discusses the structural and societal forces that Black residents were
confronted with during the years in which they chose to settle in the City of Milwaukee, and
throughout the United States, the available research does not express the entire history of the
Black urban experience. Uncovering and explaining the structural and societal influences merely
allows the reader to grasp the full power and extent of pressure that outside voices had over
environments that they, themselves, did not inhabit. Although many scholars stop at this initial
uncovering of material, this is problematic because facts, figures, and accounts that are already
available do not tell the entire story. The exploration of the environments that Black residents
inhabited and the inclusion of personal accounts and descriptions are crucial to the conversation.
These additional pieces of information help not only scholars, but the general public as well,
understand the entirety of the Black urban experience and begins to uncover evidence used to
dispel popular views of Black residents as indifferent to environmental changes and idle when
changes taking place negatively affected them.
To uncover a large piece of Milwaukee’s urban experience from the perspective of its
Black population, one must look at the space in which three-fourths of the city’s Black
population resided in, Bronzeville.136 The general term “Bronzeville” is often used to describe
areas in Northern cities that are segregated into sectors of color bounded by customs and laws.137
Sociologist Horace R. Cayton explains that the use of the term “bronze” to refer to skin color
was preferred by many Black people due to the negative connotations linked to the terms
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“Negro” and “Black.” In addition, by using the neighborhood name “Bronzeville,” Black
residents hoped to remove some of the stigmas that went along being designated a “Black
neighborhood.”138
Like many other United States cities that boasted their own Bronzeville, Milwaukee’s
Bronzeville grew quickly. In 1930, Highland Boulevard, Walnut Street, Third Street, and
Twelfth Street bound Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, all of which were designated as a fourth (D)
grade or as undeveloped on HOLC139 maps. By 1960, the area expanded north to Keefe Avenue,
east to the Milwaukee River, and west to Twenty-First Street.140 As the area encompassed by the
term “Bronzeville” increased, the amount of structures contained in the area increased as well.
On HOLC maps, these additional homes and buildings contained only a third (C) or fourth grade,
designation. Figure 5 illustrates the expansion and movement of the Bronzeville community
from 1905 through the 1940s.

138
Mutope Johnson, “The Old Heart of Milwaukee’s African American Could Beat Again,” Urban Milwaukee,
August 18, 2013, http:// http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2013/08/18/bronzeville-the-old-heart-of-milwaukees-africanamerica-could-beat-again/, Accessed February 22, 2016.
139
Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: Residential Security Map, United States Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1938, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee American
Geographical Society Library Digital Map Collection.
140
Geenen, Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 7.

48

Figure 5: Map of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 1905-1940s.
Source: Genevieve G. McBride and Stephen R. Byers,
“The First Mayor of Black Milwaukee: J. Anthony Josey,”
The Wisconsin Magazine of History, 91(2) 2008, 2.

Though the creation of Bronzeville was heavily influenced by those in power through
legal regulations and targeted discourse, Black people residing in this area created their own
sense of place and community within their controlled borders. As Katherine McKittrick suggests,
Black geographies can be said to be connected to “practices of domination” that “shape, but do
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not wholly define, [B]lack worlds.”141 Instead, in many cases, Black residents took these
practices of domination and created a sense of place in their confined spaces within the city.
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was a prime example.
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was compromised of Black owned and run businesses,
entertainment venues, churches, social service agencies, and social clubs, many of which lined
its main road, Walnut Street.142 Neighborhood businesses allowed for local commerce and
employment opportunities while aiding in the creation of an environment that allowed for close
social relationships, community support, and shared resources. Bronzeville became a lively,
flourishing hub for collaboration, communication, and community even though race and
discrimination continued to play a factor in the lives of Black residents.
By exploring the Black sense of place that Black Milwaukeeans created in Bronzeville, a
small piece of their culture and history can be promoted and reinforced in contrast to the many
instances of the erasure of Black history. The assets of the Bronzeville community and the
people that compromised the area’s population refute the views that Black people lacked a sense
of pride in the spaces that they inhabited and, thus, these views can be largely dismissed within
the City of Milwaukee. This particular exploration of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville opens the door
for additional research into the Black urban experience in cities throughout the United States. It
is the hope of this researcher that this project will promote the exploration of the Black urban
experience in additional sectors of Milwaukee’s economy and city limits over a larger period of
time. Not only will this promote the Black urban experience of the past to be revisited, but it will
also encourage researchers to look at the ongoing urban experience from the perspective of those
who are directly affected by the urban environment.
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Creating Community: Laying the Foundation for a Black Sense of Place
To accommodate the ever-increasing Black population during the periods of the Great
Migration, churches became the cornerstone of survival for many Black individuals and families.
St. Mark African Methodist Episcopal Church, Calvary Baptist, St. Benedict the Moor Mission
and School, the Church of God in Christ, and the Greater Galilee Baptist Church served Black
people in the Bronzeville area by addressing spiritual, social, and economic needs. Places of
worship provided opportunities for socialization and aided in the establishment of schools,
employment agencies, and social welfare groups.143 In one account of the role of the church in
resident’s lives, a congregant of the Church of God recalled her mother, the minister’s wife,
“…help[ing] many people, those that had no homes to live in, those that had no food, those that
had no clothes. She went around the street gathering up wayward children… [Our] home was
always open to all strangers.”144 Not only was this type of social service instrumental in bringing
bodies into the church, these services helped keep families afloat, especially newly arrived
individuals and families from Southern states.
Churches represented more than just a spiritual meeting ground. They served as a place
where Black culture and Black community could grow and offered a safe place for Black people
to discuss issues present in their everyday lives. Before and after services, church congregations
gathered together and exchanged information, shared resources, and provided support for one
another “sort of like a beehive” oftentimes “without even asking for it.”145 In some
circumstances, as discussed in Osofsky’s exploration of Harlem, churches also played a role in
the development of the physical environment. Churches often invested heavily in local real
143

Ibid., 8 & 25.
Trotter, Black Milwaukee, 132.
145
Fullilove, Root Shock, 119-120.
144

51

estate, either buying structures to conduct their services in or to house Black residents having
difficulty finding other housing options. Unlike Black individuals, Black churches could not be
barred from purchasing property covered by restrictive housing covenants. Thus, churches
became a vector through which Black residents were able to gain access to certain sections of the
city that they would normally have been banned from living in.146 Churches became a main
staple in the Bronzeville community in each of these ways and continued to provide support for
residents as the borders continued to grow.
Not surprisingly, the vast needs of community members put a large amount of pressure
on churches, parishioners, and ministers. To aid in dispersing the burden, all-Black social clubs,
such as Les Belles Femmes, the Top Hat Club, and the Variety Boys, were formed. These social
clubs held fundraisers and events to raise money for various endeavors, including supplying
families in need with the funds to purchase possessions for their homes or to support their
livelihoods after losing a loved one.147 The number of these clubs rose rapidly and by 1953,
there were eighty-seven social clubs listed in the Negro Business Directory.148 Both the church
and social clubs served to promote the needs of the Bronzeville community through providing
basic needs for area residents, but they also became organizations that helped Black residents
realize that a better life was attainable through community cohesion.
The sense of community and support created through congregations and social clubs
trickled down to other parts of the Bronzeville neighborhood. Black owned businesses began to
pop up, especially along the area’s main thoroughfare, Walnut Street. Entertainment became the
core of what Bronzeville was known for. During the 1940s, Jazz and Blues clubs were plenty and
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served as a channel for Black self-expression. Many called this area “Milwaukee’s Harlem” due
to the popularity of entertainment options, especially Blues and Jazz music venues.149 Record
stores, such as The Bop Shop (612 W. Walnut St.) and Harlem Records (919 W. Walnut St.),
served as meeting grounds for music lovers, both Black and white. Live entertainment at taverns,
such as the Rose Room (604 W. Walnut St.), Savoy (710 W. Walnut St.), 700 Tap (700 W.
Walnut St.), and Jon and Lou’s (823 W. Walnut St.), showcased this music up-close and
personal.150 Milwaukee attracted nationally known performers like Count Basie, Dizzy Gillespie,
Nat “King” Cole, Louis Armstrong, and Duke Ellington.151 As in cities across the nation, these
Black performers were not able to stay in white-run hotels and often ended up staying at the
homes of Bronzeville residents or above the taverns and venues that they played at.152
A neighborhood staple, the Regal Theater (704 W. Walnut St.), formerly known as the
Rose Theater, became much more than a place to see movies. In 1938 Prominent Black lawyer
James W. Dorsey remodeled the theater and began showing films with all Black casts. 153 By
1950, the theater was sold to Sidney Margoles who increased the theater’s film selections to
include westerns and cartoons, drawing in Black families for triple features.154 The theater was
rented out for social events, civil talks, and educational purposes. In the early 1950s, Black track
star, Jesse Owens, visited the Regal Theater to speak with local Black youth. Amateur nights
were initiated for local acts and the Regal became a venue for local teenagers to learn the art of
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jitterbugging, a popular form of swing dancing. 155 Margoles also hired local teenagers to work as
clerks, ushers, and cashiers.156
The successes of these entertainment venues paved the way for other Bronzeville
businesses to open their doors. Many restaurants, lounges, and drive-ins opened along Walnut
Street, seeing large spikes in business when accommodating the after-hours crowds.157 Some of
the restaurants that lined Walnut Street included Tompkins Ice Cream Parlor (816 W. Walnut
St.), Deacon Jones Chicken Shack (537 W. Walnut St.), Clara’s Restaurant (722 W. Walnut St.),
and Boatner’s Chili (709 W. Walnut Street). Other businesses, such as real estate agencies
(Johnson Agency – 921 W. Walnut St.), barbershops (Deluxe Barber Shop – 939 W. Walnut St.),
law firms (Theodore Coggs, Attorney at Law – 635A. W. Walnut St.), clothing stores (Bentley’s
Clothing and Jewelry – 1138 W. Walnut St.), grocery stores (Silverstein Grocery Store – 732 W.
Walnut St.), laundromats (T. Joe’s Self Service Launderette – 718 W. Walnut St.), and mechanic
shops (Jones Service Station – 603 W. Walnut St.), dotted Walnut Street during Bronzeville’s
prime.158 In the 1950-1951 edition of the Negro Business Guide to the State of Wisconsin, thirtyfive taverns, twenty-seven restaurants, fifteen beauty shops, twelve barbershops, twelve grocery
stores, eleven auto repair shops, five laundromats, and eight attorney locations were found to be
owned and run by Black individuals and families throughout the City of Milwaukee, many of
which were located in Bronzeville.159
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Though many of the businesses contained in Bronzeville were owned and operated by
Black residents in the 1940s (109) and 1950s (210), Jewish-run establishments still existed.160
The difficulties Black residents faced when attempting to coexist with other white populations
did not exist to the same extent with area Jewish business owners. They willingly hired Black
employees in their delis, fish markets, and drugstores.161 The patronage at Black and white
owned establishments crossed color lines and these venues served as a place where skin color
seemingly did not matter.
Applying and acquiring the licenses for businesses in the area did not follow this same
trajectory. In comparison to their white counterparts, Black occupants who desired to open their
own businesses often had to jump through additional hoops to acquire business loans and
licenses.162 In some instances, white businessmen approached Black businesses that were having
difficulty obtaining licenses with proposals to provide a front to obtain licenses and would split
the profits. One such example was Dason’s Tavern on Fifth Street and Center Street. Owner
Arary Charles was having difficulty receiving a liquor license even though his establishment was
ready to open its doors. Ronald Silverman, a Jewish businessman looking to get into the tavern
business, heard of Charles’ troubles. Silverman approached Charles and his wife with a proposal
of Silverman taking over the management of Dason’s and Charles remaining the owner of the
establishment. This front for Dason’s liquor license proved successful and the tavern’s doors
opened in 1951.163
In the instances where white partners did not approach Black businessmen, other ways of
financing a business needed to be utilized. Black social clubs often put up the money for venues
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to open for business and continued to support them by hosting special events, charging members
of other social organizations for tickets, and providing compensation for national and local acts
out of their own pockets.164 Amusement companies also provided the means for businesses to
receive small loans. These companies would provide businesses with a small amount of money
in addition to in-house entertainment, such as jukeboxes and pool tables, under contracts that
lasted anywhere from three to ten years. A percentage of the revenue generated by these types of
in-house entertainment was appropriated to the amusement companies, often at high rates.
However high these rates were, in the face of relegated economic prospects, they offered a way
for businessmen and women in Bronzeville to keep their doors open.165 Sometimes these
revenues were also used for charitable purposes, helping out organizations or individuals in their
time of need.166 Other times, less than legal activities were used to finance daily operations.
While gambling, bootlegging, and prostitution were prevalent in Bronzeville, policy
games were the most frequent forms of “vice” found in the area. In these games, players picked
any amount of numbers between one and seventy-eight with the chance to win more money the
more numbers you picked and got correct. The winning policy numbers were picked each day
from as far away as Covington, Kentucky, and were wired to Milwaukee for final payouts.167 In
1948, the Milwaukee Journal found that there were approximately eleven illegal “wheels”
operating within the city, generating over $1 million annually.168 The Milwaukee Journal and the
Milwaukee Sentinel estimated between 150 and 200 men were employed as wheel operators,
pickup men, counters, checkers, writers, and runners for Milwaukee’s policy gaming, with 5

164

Luhrssen, “Walnut Street Rhythm,” 34.
Geenen, Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 9.
166
Vick, “Milwaukee’s Afro-American Businesses,” 66.
167
Matthew J. Prigge, Milwaukee Mayhem: Murder and Mystery in the Cream City’s First Century, (Milwaukee,
WI: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2015, 91-92.
168
Geenen, Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 57.
165

56

percent of the city’s population accounting for over 50 percent of the gambling that occurred
within its limits.169 Not only did policy games offer a source of employment for local residents,
but they also helped Black owned businesses gain startup capital by hosting these types of
amusements and receiving a certain percentage cut of the revenues.
Over time, these illegal activities became an economic and social institution in the
neighborhood. Although both rich and poor and Black and white individuals utilized the
institution of wagering, it began to take on its own stereotypes depending on what type of
wagering participants were involved in. White people were seen to engage in clean and
respectable types of betting, such as horse racing, while Black people were seen as those who
engaged in the dirty, lazy forms of gambling, such as policy games. These stereotypes reinforced
the racial divide and brought about an increased police presence in Black communities
throughout the United States to put a stop to this dishonorable form of gambling.170 Although
this forced policy games further and further underground, they remained an integral part of the
Bronzeville community.
In the latter years of Bronzeville’s existence, locally based Columbia Savings and Loan, a
Black owned and operated banking institution, offered Black business owners additional
financial backing. Keeping financial resources within the Bronzeville community allowed Black
businesses to thrive and made it possible for business owners to make a decent living without
running the risk of meeting racial discrimination in terms of financing.171
Black owned businesses were opened and supported by many hours of overtime worked
by Black men and women. The establishment of community businesses represented the
philosophy that many Black migrants brought with them on their journey North, a “pull yourself
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up by the bootstraps” ethos.172 Hard work was not snubbed in Milwaukee’s Black community
and was often a characteristic passed on to younger generations. The children of businessmen
and women worked at their family’s establishments after school and on the weekends. Business
owners who did not have children or other family members in the area hired local teens and area
residents to fill the empty roles at their establishments. During and immediately following the
Great Depression, this internal hiring practice became more and more crucial. By 1940, “51
percent of [Black] men were unemployed, with 29 percent of them actively looking for work.”173
By hiring employees from the immediate neighborhood, financial resources were maintained
locally, social ties were strengthened, and community cohesion increased.
In addition to providing job opportunities, the larger community engaged area youth in
the direct environment to keep them out of trouble and to provide them with an opportunity to
connect with their emerging sense of self. As stated earlier, youth artists were invited to perform
at the Regal Theater for small community events, as well as larger social gatherings. Local high
school student musicians were often invited to showcase their talents at area jazz clubs and were
mentored by Leonard Gay, Jimmy Dudley, and Bert Bailey, native jazz and blues musicians who
had gained notoriety on city, state, and national scales.174 The MUL put together sporting events
to provide Black youth with positive role models. Professional boxer, Baby Joe Gans, was
brought to Milwaukee’s Bronzeville to train Black youth who were interested in boxing. Ethel
Brunner, the first Black employee at Lapham Park Social Center, taught Bronzeville girls
modeling and dancing and created a program to teach girls how to play baseball.175 The
Northside Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) at Sixth Street and North Avenue was
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constructed in the late 1950s to provide a space for youth and adults to occupy themselves in
positive ways, such as field trips, after school and evening classes, and social activities.176
Leaders in the community looked to these types of activities to bring youth together and to teach
them skills to create a better life for themselves and for their families.
Suitable educational opportunities were also important to local residents and families.
Adolescents attended one of ten area schools: Fourth Street, Siefert, Lloyd Street, St. Francis,
Ninth Street, Roosevelt Junior High, St. Benedict the Moor, Lincoln High, North Division High,
or Girls Tech.177 All of these schools, with the exception of Siefert and St. Francis,
predominately served Black students. Because of the hypersegregation of Milwaukee, even
though federal school desegregation was mandated through 1954’s Brown vs. Board of
Education, Bronzeville schools remained 90 percent Black by 1960.178 The ethos of hard work
followed Black students into the realm of education. Students seeking higher instruction attended
Milwaukee Technical School at night while working during the day, which was typical of area
high school students as well.179
To solidify themselves as an entity with their own set of customs and regulations,
Bronzeville residents unofficially elected their own mayor, J. Anthony Josey, in 1945.180
Although not officially recognized by local or federal government, Josey served as the “official
‘greeter’ for the district, leader of social affairs, unofficial spokesman of the [Black] population,
and ‘friend in need’ to any and all of his constituents.”181 Josey was instrumental in Bronzeville’s
participation at the polls and fought against the negative portrayal of Milwaukee’s Black
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population in the Milwaukee Journal. He solidified a public apology from the local publication
for their racially biased news judgment, including revealing of the race of criminals only when
the criminal happened to be Black.182 Josey also promoted patronage at local Black owned
businesses and believed that having neighborhood businesses that employed local community
members was a way in which the Black community could develop “powerful institutions” that
would represent a “long step in the solution” to the problem of racial inequality.183 J. Anthony
Josey became a real estate agent to adequately represent and advocate for potential Black
homeowners. He also served as a mentor to Bronzeville’s youth as an advisor to an all-boy’s
baseball team and spearheaded additional activities for youth groups at the Northside YMCA.184
Josey’s commitment to Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was unwavering.
While he pushed for community progress, particularly political and economic strides, J.
Anthony Josey was largely against instances of intentional racial separation. Assigning Black
social workers, nurses, and probation officers to Black clientele and the creation of the MUL’s
all-Black social center were steps in the wrong direction in Josey’s mind. In addition, as Black
voters shifted from the support of Republican candidates to the support of Democratic
candidates, Josey stood fast as a faithful Republican, even as Republican candidates became
progressively conservative.185 Despite Josey’s seemingly contradictory stances when compared
to the larger Black population, Bronzeville residents stood behind him and hailed him a
champion of Black causes until his death in July of 1957.186
Bronzeville’s physical environment reflected the pride that community members began to
feel as housing options and economic prospects were strengthened. Streets and sidewalks were
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free of clutter and the frequency of street crimes was low.187 Green spaces were utilized for
community picnics and get-togethers to keep the community strong.188 Relationships with the
police force were generally positive with many active officers frequenting local businesses and
nightclubs both during and after their shifts.189
Each of these pieces of the Bronzeville community contributed to the creation of a center
for Black culture, but they also allowed for a community to develop economically and socially.
Because of the discrimination that Black residents continually faced, they understood that in
order to survive they would need to band together to push one another up instead of drag one
another down. Neighbors in this area were close, so close “that if a kid did something naughty on
one end of the block, his parents would already know about it by the time he got home.”190 Many
residents were able to sleep and go to work without locking their doors and some even slept
outside when the weather was too hot.191 Residents looked to one another for aid in raising
children, finding employment opportunities, borrowing money for bills or car repairs, and for
help when a member of the family had fallen ill. Community became more than neighbors,
community became family.192 Though the majority of Milwaukee’s white population saw
Bronzeville as a successful containment of the Black community, others saw the area as a space
for budding opportunity and the creation of a solidified sense of place. This feeling, however,
would not last.

The End of the Line
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Urban renewal and redevelopment projects of the 1950s and 1960s quickly expanded to
include major parts of the sizeable area that Bronzeville now comprised. Most notably, the
continued growth of the I-43 expressway, the use of eminent domain practices, changes in city
codes, and continued designation of blight threatened the homes, businesses, and community that
area residents worked so hard to create. While the total number of Bronzeville homes and
businesses destroyed for the construction of the expressway is unknown, by visualizing the total
amount of space needed for a six-lane roadway, exits and on-ramps, and construction materials
and machines for the over twenty-five blocks of Bronzeville, one can begin to grasp the enormity
of the devastation.
In addition to initial freeway plans, the construction of the Hillside Housing Project, one
low-rent housing development, was undertaken in 1948 on the south side of Walnut Street.
Bounded by Sixth Street, Ninth Street, Galena Street, and Vliet Street, this project was
completed by 1955.193 However, what started off as a one-building housing project grew into a
full-blown redevelopment project by 1957. The main objective of the Hillside Redevelopment
Project was to demolish dilapidated and substandard buildings in the area, like many other urban
renewal projects plans. What makes this particular project worth noting is that this development
was located in the middle of the Black business district. This region of Bronzeville contained
ninety-nine businesses, over 47 percent of the total number of Black owned businesses in the
area. While business owners were given control over the sale of their businesses and the land
they were built on, if they could not find a buyer in the allotted amount of time, the city would
take their properties through the use of eminent domain.194
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In addition to businesses, 414 families and 126 boarders, of which 98 percent were Black,
were displaced through the demolition of the structures deemed unfit for inhabitation.195 Many of
these displaced residents were, in fact, eligible to become inhabitants in the Hillside low-rent
housing development, but were pushed out due to the 318 returning veterans and reunited
families, many of whom were white, competing for 222 housing units.196 This overcrowding and
competition led many displaced Black families to leave the community they knew and loved to
seek housing, employment, and business opportunities elsewhere.
Only a small fraction of those Black residents displaced chose to live in housing projects
constructed through urban renewal plans. These housing projects, such as Seaway Terrace,
located at 4601 South First Street, well to the south of Bronzeville, and Zander Terrance, located
near Green Tree Road and Teutonia Avenue, well to the north of Bronzeville, were situated in
unfamiliar areas and inhabited by unfamiliar people. Seaway Terrace contained only four
residents from the Bronzeville area while Zander Terrace contained only six.197
To attract displaced residents to other housing options located throughout the city,
Milwaukee’s Housing Authority sent advertisements and invitations to dislocated inhabitants,
but received little to no response.198 Citing a 1960 collaborative study between the MUL and the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Wesley Scott, MUL representative, stated that displaced
Black residents were often willing to relocate to other parts of the city, but were only willing to
do so if they were guaranteed social acceptance.199 At this particular time in history, as in
decades past, social acceptance could never be guaranteed.
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In 1959, Milwaukee’s Land Commission Chief Researcher, Robert Ducharme, stated that
most of the residents displaced by urban renewal efforts continued to live within a two-mile
radius of their original residences.200 Milwaukee’s Housing Authority and Department of City
Development suggested that, “…people from the center of the city don’t want to move to the
extremes of the city…” and would rather not face the unknown of a new area and the potential
for continued racial discrimination.201 Thus, overcrowding in remaining area homes became
increasingly prevalent, further exacerbating the housing crisis in Bronzeville and in the Black
community as a whole.
By 1966, compensation for displaced homeowners and business owners was increased to
include the market value of the property, moving expenses, personal property losses, and
additional incidentals. While this may have seemed like a step in the right direction by the
government, there was no entity put in place to aid these displaced homeowners and businesses
in finding alternative locations to relocate. In addition, this new regulation did not compensate
displaced residents who were renting their homes.202
Aldermen George Whittow and Clarence Miller suggested another approach to housing
displaced residents in 1966. In their approach, instead of constructing new structures for
displaced families to live in, the city would buy existing vacant homes in the inner core and rent
them to individuals and families who had been displaced. When the amount of rent an individual
or a family paid equaled the purchase price of the home, the home would then be donated to the
resident or residents. However, due to continued freeway expansion, the housing stock of the
inner city continued to dwindle and this plan never came to fruition.203
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Instead, Black residents who had been displaced were left to utilize whatever resources
they could find. As stated above, this often led to overcrowding in the homes that still existed in
the area. It also led to an increase in the prevalence of the characteristics assigned to the term
blight discussed in Chapter One: the age of buildings, population gain and loss, structural
deterioration, and declines in certain health indicators. The continued prevalence of these
characteristics in the central city designated them as disposable areas along with the people that
inhabited them. Little regard was given to the Black people who were being displaced.

Urban Renewal as the Destruction of a Black Sense of Place and Root Shock
Not only does this description of Bronzeville serve as an example of the erasure of the
Black sense of place, it also serves as one of the many examples of urban renewal projects
creating root shock. As Katherine McKittrick suggests, Black communities are configured
spatially to reflect “practices of domination and deliberate attempts to destroy a Black sense of
place.”204 The individuals and groups that bought property, practiced eminent domain, and made
the plans for urban renewal projects and the construction and expansion of the freeway did so
without thinking much about the businesses and families that would be affected by the
demolition required for these projects. When an outcry was heard from the general public, those
in power dismissed accusations as trivial in comparison to the great amount of good urban
renewal projects would bring to the City of Milwaukee. Additionally, it can be said that perhaps
those in power were threatened by the sense of culture and community support that was present
in the Bronzeville area. Black residents were conducting a majority of their monetary
interactions amongst themselves, a Black Alderwoman was elected to office, the area had its own
“mayor,” neighbors relied on one another for emotional and monetary support, schools were
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centrally located and made up of community members, and social clubs and organizations were
formed and provided a foundational support for the community as a whole. It is conceivable,
then, that other communities, largely the white community, saw Bronzeville as a threat to their
continued domination and sought to legally destroy it through urban renewal projects and the
placement of the I-43 expressway.
This occurrence follows McKittrick’s argument and lends itself to a discussion of
urbicide, or the “deliberate death of the city and willful place annihilation.”205 By forcing Black
residents into the spaces that made up Bronzeville and then destroying those places years later, it
can be said those in power put the act of urbicide into action. It is no coincidence that the
freeway was constructed through a vibrant Black community. It is no coincidence that several
Milwaukee landmarks are currently situated in areas that once contained Black residents. These
roadways and landmarks were deliberately placed in these areas by deeming them slums and
finding blight through the creation of fluid manifestations of what blight was. By allowing for
this fluidity in term, blight took on a wide variety of meanings and encompassed a wide variety
of structures and, at the same time, people. This blight was found in deliberate areas, setting up
an environment for “willful place annihilation” and the destruction of the Black sense of place
that had been created there.
Mindy Thompson Fullilove looks at the destruction of the Black sense of place and
urbicide from another light. She uses the term root shock to describe the emotional upheaval that
urban renewal projects caused within those whose sense of place was destroyed. Fullilove
explores this root shock on the individual level and the community level. Within the individual,
root shock has negative effects on trust, relationships, social, emotional, and financial resources,
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and personal health and anxiety levels.206 While there are relatively few personal accounts of
Bronzeville’s root shock on the individual level in recorded history, the sheer number of Black
people displaced can attest to the negative effects of root shock that Fullilove describes.
At the community level, Fullilove’s description of root shock includes the physical
destruction of neighborhoods and the emotional bonds that are created in neighborhood settings.
Through the exploration of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, this community’s root shock is not hard to
see. The I-43 expressway cut Bronzeville almost perfectly in half, cutting off one side of the
neighborhood from the other and destroying everything in between. The business thoroughfare,
Walnut Street, did not escape this community incision. Because residents were unable to cross
six lanes of traffic to get to either side of the expressway for their needs, both emotional and
tangible, relationships, businesses, and livelihood suffered. The continued demolition of homes
and businesses in the area exacerbated these effects and Bronzeville, as a whole, would never
exist again. Fullilove fully anticipates this ongoing effect of root shock stating that entire
societies and future generations will be affected by this upheaval.207 Although pieces of
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville still exist, along with the name itself, the area has not been able to
recreate the prosperity and sense of community cohesion that it once had in the immense amount
of space that the area encompassed.
What Chapter Two also highlights is the importance of institutions in the creation,
maintenance, and destruction of an urban community. Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, for example,
was influenced by many different institutions that shaped the history of its existence.
Bronzeville’s social institutions, such as families, the community, churches, social clubs, and
businesses, regulated acceptable behaviors of area citizens and created a set of expectations for
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individuals. These institutions banded together to ensure that area residents were granted basic
living necessities by providing support, guidance, resources, and employment opportunities to
positively encourage and assist the environment they were a part of.
Other institutions, such as governmental entities and certain media outlets, were
instrumental in the destruction of Bronzeville. In partnership with the media, governmental
bodies were able to portray Bronzeville as an area with a large amount of blight and hardship to
garner support for the massive amount of demolition that occurred in the neighborhood. These
institutions were able to manipulate the narrative of the Bronzeville community in conjunction
with the narrative of the City of Milwaukee to create a conversation that supported their end goal
of bringing a tax base back to the central city. At the same time, this narrative masked the reality
that urban renewal projects were successfully and diligently destroying a vibrant, cohesive
community and displacing thousands of local residents. Governmental institutions then often
denied responsibility for locating or creating alternative housing options for these displaced
residents. When these institutions did take action to create housing, the location of these options
were highly controlled and heavily influenced by social institutions far removed from the
Bronzeville community, in this case, the city’s white population. The exploration of these
different types of institutions in various contexts can add to urban histories and the historical
scholarship of cities in a way that helps to uncover the interplay between institutions and how
certain institutions became more valued and influential than others.
In the case of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, the social institutions of family, community,
churches, social clubs, and businesses are often left out of the conversation of the Black urban
experience. In particular, the creation of grassroots and community led organizations as
institutions within the Black community during the time of urban renewal has been
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predominately ignored. Milwaukee’s Black community did not let the physical destruction of
their space become the blueprint for their cultural and community destruction. The late 1960s
marked a pivotal moment in the Black community - a movement towards the integration of
grassroots and community led movements as social institutions. The community members
involved in this movement were committed to the revitalization and redevelopment of Black
neighborhoods and sought to emphasize the voices of those who had been displaced by urban
renewal.
Chapter Three discusses the actions of a community led organization, the Walnut Area
Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO, in working to change the perception of the “slice” of
Bronzeville that this particular group of inhabited and represented. Chapter Three focuses on the
evolution of WAICO from a five-member group to a full-blown community organization that
attracted the support of other Milwaukee organizations, businesses, leaders, and members of the
general public. Initially focused on preventing bulldozers from demolishing an ever-depleting
housing stock through the physical improvement of their neighborhoods, WAICO quickly
become a large player in the area’s housing market. Through these actions, WAICO sought to
become a voice for area residents, to fight against negative social perceptions of Black residents,
and to fight for their sense of place in a changing city.
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Chapter Three
From Root Shock to Community Collaboration:
Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc.

Due to federal urban renewal legislation and local manifestations of this revitalization
and redevelopment movement, many of Milwaukee’s Black residents, both individuals and entire
families, were uprooted and forced to define a new sense of place within a city they had
inhabited for years. The construction of the I-43 expressway decimated the existing community
of Bronzeville that housed three-fourths of Milwaukee’s Black population. These residents spent
the better half of the early 1900s creating a thriving and united community in which they
increasingly took pride. However, with the appearance of urban renewal projects, this
community was split into smaller groups in pockets of the city. While some Black residents were
able to stay in their homes and continue to run businesses, they were cut off from the larger
Black community that they had worked for many years to create. This fission of Black kinship
no doubt had an effect on Black Milwaukeean’s sense of place and led to many of the
characteristics of root shock described in Chapters One and Two. Even though the considerable
destruction of the Black community had these extensive negative effects, the pockets of Black
residents that were created did not sit idle. Instead, Black residents looked to one another for
support and made the decision to work together to preserve the remaining areas of their
community and to prevent further demolition and subsequent displacement. One such instance of
this continued community cohesion is demonstrated through the creation of the Walnut Area
Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO.
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Located on the west side of the I-43 expressway construction project, the newly deemed
“Walnut Area” spanned an area of nine blocks by three blocks and included hundreds of existing
structures. Mirroring the greater Bronzeville community, Walnut Area residents were committed
to one another and the area in which they resided. In response to urban renewal projects that
were threatening their area, residents came together to form WAICO. This community led
organization focused on neighborhood development through physical improvements, such as
garbage pickups, rat abatement, the removal of abandoned vehicles, the updating of residences,
and the promotion of their area as a thriving community. The early successes of these types of
initiatives spurred the growth of the organization’s mission to include the construction of new
housing opportunities in the area. It was the hope of WAICO that displaced Bronzeville residents
would relocate to what was left of the Walnut Street area, but also that current residents would
remain in the area. While there were many successes in the endeavors of WAICO, there were
many roadblocks that WAICO faced.
Chapter Three explores the WAICO story utilizing multiple perspectives, including
organizational members, the organization’s two presidents, and community stakeholders, such as
Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Milwaukee Mayor Henry W. Maier, and Willis and Lillian
Leenhouts, local architects. This chapter will argue that the societal perception of Black residents
as lazy, dirty, and indifferent is incorrect and unfounded as evidenced by the Walnut Area
neighborhood. It will also argue that despite structural influences, forward progress for
Milwaukee’s Black community was possible through the engagement of the Black community
itself. It is through this community engagement that Walnut Area residents attempted to hold on
to a Black sense of place and prevent additional instances of root shock within its borders. By
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exploring WAICO and its initiatives, the history of the Black urban experience in Milwaukee can
reach the potential of being a more comprehensive history of the time period.

Establishment and Evolution: The Forward Progress of a Community Group
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, urban renewal efforts throughout the nation
negatively affected the Black population. This occurred through the massive displacement of
individuals and families and the destruction of a large portion of their economic base. While
some affected by urban renewal allowed decisions made by those in power to continually affect
them, many Black people worked to take the preservation and revitalization of their culture and
community back into their own hands. It is no secret that Milwaukee’s dominant Black
community, Bronzeville, and central business hub, Walnut Street, were ripped in half by freeway
construction and other urban renewal projects. But what is less widely known is that there was an
early effort to sustain a sense of community and gain control over neighborhood issues. This was
expressed through the creation of the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO.
In advance of a formalized community organization, a small cluster of residents from the
1800 block of North Eleventh Street banded together to form the North Eleventh Street
Improvement Club in 1959. This club worked to clean up glass and trash from their block’s
streets and sidewalks and engaged children by asking them to be neighborhood “sheriffs” and
“deputies,” monitoring block activities. Two years later, the 1700 and 1900 blocks of North
Eleventh Street joined the club and started to put pressure on the city to remove vacant and
dilapidated homes and buildings from their blocks. By 1962, as the North Eleventh Street
Improvement Club gained steam, they changed their name to Citizens for Progress to indicate
that their efforts were put into place to push the community forward. In addition to a name
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change, they expanded their club by offering woodworking and sewing classes, participating in
MUL’s Neighbor-to-Neighbor Program, and were asked to join Mayor Henry W. Maier’s
Citizens Participation Subcommittee.208
In early 1965, a group of five Milwaukee residents, James Richardson, Jimmie Davidson,
Katherine Brewster, Wesley Hutchins, and Eugene Walker, approached University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s Urban Affairs Professor, Dr. Warner Bloomberg, Jr., to provide an
eight-week community leadership training for Citizens for Progress and other community
leaders.209 This training was aimed at giving individuals the tools to improve the economic
vitality and overall livelihood of their neighborhood through community self-help initiatives.210
Following the completion of this training, these five residents, combined with the input of local
organizations Citizens for Progress, Central City Association, St. James Methodist Church, and
Christ Presbyterian Church, formed the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO, on
April 1, 1965. WAICO’s main goal was to improve the physical appearance of the area bounded
by Eleventh Street, Twentieth Street, Walnut Street, and Brown Street.211 In the years following
the establishment of WAICO, the organization expanded its impact area southward to include
Galena Street; in total, the WAICO area included nineteen square blocks and over 800
structures.212 On Milwaukee’s HOLC maps, every block and structure contained within
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WAICO’s designated boundaries were given a fourth (D) grade, designating the entire area as an
extremely risky space to invest in.213 Figure 6 illustrates the boundaries of WAICO’s target area.

Figure 6: WAICO Project Area Map. Source: “WAICO Project Area,” undated, Folder 26,
Box 2, Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records, 1936-1990, University of WisconsinMilwaukee Archives.

WAICO leaders decided that in order to be taken seriously they must establish their own
Constitution and By-Laws. In their written Constitution, the stated purpose of WAICO is “…to
improve the living conditions of the area in which we live, or the property, and to see that
neighborhood problems are solved by neighborhood people.”214 Members were to be “[a]ny
interested person who lives, or owns property, in the WAICO area, or anyone interested in
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joining who is acceptable to the Executive Board, is eligible for membership.”215 The
establishment of these guidelines clearly emphasized the motivation for WAICO: improving the
lives of area residents while engaging with whomever may advance this ultimate goal.
WAICO leaders focused the organization’s early efforts on keeping the bulldozers that
accompanied urban renewal projects to limited spaces within their established boundaries. In an
article in the Sunday, January 9, 1966 edition of The Milwaukee Journal, WAICO President
Eugene P. Walker is quoted as saying, “…we (WAICO) understand that it is possible in urban
renewal not to have to tear down everything, and only to do spot clearance.”216 To identify the
properties that warranted demolition, community members and WAICO leaders went propertyto-property to identify area structures that were in serious need of attention. Of the 800 structures
located in the WAICO area, most were constructed before 1920 and, by 1960, 42 percent of the
structures considered to be residential dwellings were found to be in “dilapidated” or
“deteriorated” condition.217 After an initial list was compiled, WAICO members came to the
realization that many of the structures deemed dilapidated could be spared through the physical
improvement of their exterior and interior conditions. In addition, waste management would
need to be improved upon, abandoned cars would need to be removed, and a minimum standard
would need to be set for the upkeep of vacant lots.218 It would be through these projects that
WAICO could impact the decisions of city leaders and reduce the amount of blight found in their
neighborhood. Accordingly, bulldozers and demolition tactics would be used only as a last resort
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for the structures that could not be saved. WAICO leaders saw these initial steps as forward
progress away from the displacement of Black residents due to urban renewal projects.
In order to accomplish these initial goals, WAICO leaders looked to engage area
residents in revitalization and cleanup efforts. President Walker sent personal letters to area
property owners stressing the importance of becoming a “united voice” in order to keep the fate
of neighborhood homes in their hands.219 Walker urged area residents to become associate
members of WAICO for one dollar, to become a voting member by contributing five dollars, or
to directly contact WAICO officials.220 By doing so, the organization could hear the voices and
opinions of the neighborhood to determine the types of improvements and developments desired
by the people who lived there.221 WAICO also reached out to the youth of the area by involving
them in Saturday morning trash pickups and in the promotion of the organization itself. Youth
could be seen wearing WAICO buttons, answering questions about WAICO, and actively
collecting garbage from area yards. 222 It was with the help of these active youth that WAICO
began to make improvements on the physical exterior and interior structures of resident’s homes.
By August of 1965, WAICO had either completed or had begun work on over seventy-five
properties in the area and began advertising “WAICO AT WORK” signs to increase community
awareness of WAICO projects.223 By directly involving residents of all ages, power and a sense
of pride was given to the individuals who occupied the neighborhood and could feel as though
their voice was being heard amongst the noise of the bulldozers that decimated many of the
spaces that surrounded them.
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In the early months of 1966, WAICO decided to more aggressively push their agenda
with a five-point plan to conserve the WAICO area. This “Five Point Conservation Plan”
consisted of making low-interest rate loans available for WAICO residents to improve the
physical conditions of their properties, razing all buildings unfit for habitation, clearing and
sodding all vacant lots in the WAICO area, helping the city plan new construction, and
adequately lighting area streets.224 These five goals became the cornerstone of WAICO’s work
moving forward and helped to officially form Operation Green, which aimed at sodding cityowned vacant lots for small “pocket parks,” and Operation Remove All Trash (RAT). In order to
reach these goals, WAICO enlisted the help of their members, but also reached out to new
community resources, such as Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA) affiliates whom were
workers serving as a part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty programming. In this
same year, four individuals agreed to serve one year as VISTA volunteers with WAICO to fulfill
the needs of the organization that could not be met by the Board of Directors or Executive
Committee, all of whom were also volunteers.225
Along with the Five Point Conservation Plan, 1966 saw WAICO focusing much of its
effort into the positive engagement of youth and improving the well being of area occupants.
Resident Rosella Rogers was instrumental in creating WAICO’s Young People’s Organization,
which served over 100 young ladies by teaching manners, housekeeping, cooking, and sewing.226
Additionally, children from the City’s Neighborhood Job Corps were given paid positions to
work on WAICO projects. Inquiries into the welfare of area families were done by board
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members in cases where parents or their children had not been heard from or seen over a period
of time.227 WAICO also sought to expand their youth programming by creating a Youth
Committee to organize dances and other activities for local teens to participate in.228 By
engaging youth in a positive way, WAICO residents thought that they could keep them out of
trouble and teach them skills that would last a lifetime.
In the hopes of spreading the word of their work and goals, WAICO established a
newsletter for members. This first newsletter, distributed in September of 1966, outlined the
successes of Operation Green and Operation RAT, the immense amount of housing
improvements made to structures in the area, and the direction WAICO hoped to move in the
future.229 The distribution of WAICO’s newsletter caught the eye of Milwaukee’s 7th Ward
Alderman and President of the Common Council, Martin E. Schreiber. Alderman Schreiber
wrote a letter to WAICO acknowledging their “constructive” work and asked the organization to
add additional blocks to their coverage area: from West Galena and West Brown to North
Twentieth and North Twenty-Seventh Streets. WAICO accepted this proposal and took it as a
challenge to continue to be an active participant in neighborhood conservation.230
1967 saw a continued effort of WAICO to locate owners of vacant buildings and to work
with the City of Milwaukee to either tear down these properties or establish that they be kept to a
certain standard of upkeep.231 At this time, WAICO presented a plan to Milwaukee’s Common
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Council in the hopes of decreasing the spread of blight into their neighborhood. This plan built
on the already launched Five Point Conservation Plan, but added the establishment of a WAICO
office to keep residents informed of projects and initiatives and the creation of a formalized indepth survey of all structures included in the area. If accepted by the Common Council, WAICO
would be able to participate in a housing program enabling low-income families to purchase
homes that had been rehabilitated to last a minimum of thirty years, allowing WAICO members
to become property owners.232 While these expansions were already informally being
implemented by WAICO, the organization hoped that by gaining the endorsement of the
Common Council, WAICO could establish itself as a more formalized organization, allowing the
group to access resources that had been out of reach in prior years.
In 1967, WAICO’s Executive Committee and Board of Directors voted to become a
nonprofit organization and to purchase a home from a local attorney for use as a formal office
and living quarters for a needy family. Although the purchasing of this home meant significant
on-site rehabilitation, it also meant that WAICO would be the only group in Wisconsin that had
rehabilitated a home without any outside federal aid.233 With the help of WAICO members and
other community organizations, the upstairs portion of the WAICO house became move-in ready
and a significant amount of work was lined up for projects in the downstairs portion.234
Although the organization continued to expand, WAICO’s focus on the direct community
organizing did not waiver. Area wide jubilee celebrations and parties were hosted by various
WAICO residents and organizations to highlight the positive impacts that the organization was
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having on both the neighborhood and the city.235 In March of 1967, for example, WAICO’s
Operation Green was publicly recognized and received the grand prize in Mayor Henry W.
Maier’s Beautification Contest. As a result, Operation Green was awarded an additional
monetary grant of $2,000 by Milwaukee’s Common Council to utilize on continued sodding
projects.236
Mayor Henry W. Maier became a critical component in the support of WAICO projects.
In addition to the recognition of Operation Green, Mayor Maier attended several of WAICO’s
progress celebrations. At one of these such progress celebrations, Mayor Maier stated, “[t]he
problems of the central city are solved by the people in the neighborhoods whose pride and
fighting spirit overcome these problems” and cited the WAICO area as one of these
neighborhoods.237 This statement marks a contrary declaration to Mayor Maier’s approach to
neighborhood revitalization efforts from the time he took office in 1960. This flip in opinion
could be attributed to the shift in urban renewal jargon from renewal to revitalization or could,
perhaps, be due to mounting pressure from Milwaukee residents to decrease the amount of
spending and demolition that accompanied urban renewal projects. While Mayor Maier’s support
was crucial to the longevity of the organization, it was through the support of less visible, but
still vital, outsiders that WAICO continued to thrive and grow.
External individuals and organizations actively sought out opportunities to participate in
area efforts as they recognized the impacts that WAICO projects were having on the
neighborhood’s physical space. Robert G. Irwin, head of the private consultation firm
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Redevelopment Services, Inc., worked with WAICO on a pro-bono basis to aid in the creation of
programming for stimulating property improvements; Architects Willis and Lillian Leenhouts
advised the group and worked with other organizations and City of Milwaukee officials to
determine the physical needs of multiple blocks in the area.238 Robert Sutton of SherwinWilliams Paint Co., James L. Walsh of Walsh Sheet Metal, Inc., the Eleventh Street 4-H Club,
Steinman Lumber Co., and Miller Lumber Co. donated their time and resources to continue to
complete block inspections, create signage for the organization, and contributed paint and timber
for improvement projects.239 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Professor, Warner J.
Bloomberg, Jr., whose encouragement helped community leaders form the organization, hailed
WAICO as “a pioneer… in problem areas which plague our urban civilization” and continued to
be actively involved in the organization as a consultant and a member.240 With the help of key
community players such as this, WAICO received the boost that it needed to launch itself into
full-scale revitalization projects.

Carrying on the Roots of Bronzeville’s Community Support
The establishment of a community led organization followed in the evolutionary path of
the community engagement of Bronzeville residents. The social clubs, churches, businesses, and
familial ties that existed in Bronzeville before the construction of the expressway laid the
foundation for larger organizations to exist. In addition, the relationships that existed within the
larger Bronzeville community did not disappear as the structures that were consumed by urban
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renewal projects did. This groundwork made it possible for the establishment and rapid growth
of WAICO and was the basis for the types of strategies WAICO used to engage community
members. WAICO’s continued commitment to area residents made it easier for the larger
community to buy into the mission and vision of the organization. Furthermore, as area residents
had already witnessed the potential devastation that urban renewal projects could carry out, they
were eager to put a stop to further demolition and destruction. It was through these precursors
that WAICO began the task of preserving their neighborhood through the engagement of
residents.
By basing the organization’s mission on continued community unity, WAICO was able
to engage community members in ways that were meaningful and substantial. Children were not
only encouraged to participate in educational programming and social activities, but they were
also active in spreading the word about neighborhood projects. Older residents with specific
skills became teachers for other adults as well as adolescents. Physical improvements to
structures and the cleanup of vacant lots and sidewalks were clearly visible to the naked eye.
This visibility, paired with the engagement of community members, made area residents eager to
do more. It also encouraged other community organizations, businesses, and political leaders to
become more active in area efforts. These strategies were used as a way to fight the demolition
of local structures, both residential and business related, to aid in the preservation of a sense of
place and clearly demonstrate the active role that Black community members took in the
protection of their neighborhood. As a direct result of this grassroots, community led activism, it
was only three years after the organization’s establishment that WAICO was approached to take
on larger projects within the area continuing to combat the negative effects of urban renewal
projects on the Black community.
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Organizational Growth into the Housing Market
Although WAICO continued to focus on the rehabilitation of area structures,
organizations that supported WAICO pushed for them to become involved in other aspects of
revitalization efforts. In early 1968, Robert G. Irwin from Redevelopment Services, Inc.,
suggested to President Walker that WAICO involve themselves in the development of fifty to
sixty new homes in the area with mortgages not to exceed $100 per month. Irwin felt that this
new phase of WAICO could be possible due to federal and state legislation changes and the
establishment of Midtown State Bank, a local financial institution run by Black professionals. At
the same time, WAICO would not be responsible for fee payments in relation to development
projects because of public agency appropriations or the advancement of funds from lenders.
Irwin urged the Board of Directors to seriously consider this as a next phase in WAICO’s
organizational development.241
By January 15, 1968, WAICO’s Board unanimously voted to launch this new aspect of
their organization in the hopes that these new homes would be sold to present homeowners in
older homes. These older homes could then be used for public housing or for families displaced
by other urban renewal projects. Initial hopes for the project also included the use of
Milwaukee’s National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) Youth
Council to provide security patrols and to help with the construction of the homes themselves.
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Unemployed inner city residents would thereby also gain skills through employment as builders
and tradesmen.242
The Milwaukee Journal’s March 31, 1968 article reveals that in as few as three months,
WAICO had obtained sites and financial backing for the construction of their model homes with
projected dates of May 15 for groundbreaking and July 1 for completion. After securing these
sites and backing, 100 letters were sent to property owners in the area who lived in the most
substandard structures to see if they would set prices for their properties for WAICO
acquirement and redevelopment. In the seven days following the distribution of these letters,
twenty-one residents had responded favorably to WAICO’s proposition.243
The location for the construction of these new homes was easy to determine. Because of
the considerable clearance that accompanied the 1958 plans for a Park East Freeway, a large
triangle shaped area was left barren in the heart of the WAICO area. With the help of Mayor
Henry W. Maier and many other WAICO supporters, this area quickly became WAICO’s first
redevelopment project area. The exact boundaries of this triangle area are displayed in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: WAICO Triangle Area Map. Source: “WAICO
Housing Development Sound Study,” October 1, 1973, Page 18,
Folder 23, Box 121, Record of the Henry W. Maier
Administration 1960-1988, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Archives.

As this project would become WAICO’s largest undertaking, WAICO leaders revived an
earlier organization, Citizens for Progress, to concentrate efforts on communication between
residents and Milwaukee’s City Planning Department. WAICO wanted to ensure that residents’
desires for the area were heard and retained Citizens for Progress to push for the redevelopment
of this area with low-income housing options that could be utilized by existing residents.244 It
was through the undertaking of this large project that the WAICO area moved from being
designated as a demolition district to a stabilization district.245
Even with this new project, WAICO’s commitment to its residents was unwavering.
Following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., a scholarship fund was formed to create
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opportunities for low-income WAICO area children.246 Although some of these funds ended up
being used for home repairs and repainting structures by the Jaycee’s and Marquette University’s
Young Republicans Club, a large portion of the scholarship fund was used to pay summer camp
fees for low-income children in the area.247 With a $2,500 grant from the Social Development
Commission, President Walker formed and supervised two baseball leagues for young teens.
Local volunteer teachers provided classes in art, music, pet care, and storytelling for young
children were held at the newly renovated WAICO House.248
Further public attention was drawn to the WAICO area during a weekend of $2 tours of
area homes, gardens, churches, and schools. These tours brought in residents from across the city
in hopes of drawing attention, as well as funding, to localized redevelopment projects.249 While
smaller projects, such as the tours, were being organized and completed, WAICO residents
continued to paint homes at the rate of 100 per year, worked with the City Health and Building
Inspection Departments to tear down almost 100 buildings, and were instrumental in the passage
of ordinances regarding vacant lots and abandoned vehicles.250 No matter what the project or
how big the work load seemed to be, area residents were constantly reminded that without one
another, these projects would not occur and bulldozers would ultimately reach their borders.
1969 saw a change in leadership at WAICO; James Richardson, an Executive Committee
member, was elected as President. In a letter to WAICO members, Richardson assured affiliates

246

WAICO Weekly Board Meeting April 6, 1968, Folder 35, Box 2, Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects
Records 1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
247
WAICO Board Meeting August 3, 1968, Folder 35, Box 2, Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records
1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
248
Report of the WAICO Teacher’s Luncheon, November 23, 1968, Folder 23, Box 65, Charlotte Russell Partridge
and Miriam Frink Papers 1862-1980, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
249
Tour A: City Churches, Schools & Gardens, Folder 38, Box 2, Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records
1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee & Tour B: City Homes & Gardens, Folder 38, Box 2, Willis and
Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records 1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.
250
WAICO Newsletter November 1, 1968, Page 1, Folder 32, Box 2, Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Records 19361990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives.

86

that “membership and projects will expand in scope and imagination” and that WAICO would
continue to be community collaboration in action.251 This collaboration was showcased in a
groundbreaking ceremony in March of the same year for the model homes at Eighteenth Street
and Walnut Street discussed a year earlier, as well as a renovated duplex available for sale.
These newly constructed and renovated residences would be used to combat the housing
shortage. As a very serious example, while rehabilitating homes in the area, one WAICO
contractor, Bill Schwartz of Custom Design, reported that twenty-seven people were removed
from a two-bedroom home in which all of them claimed residence.252 A study of the area showed
that an average of 8.6 Black people lived in each household.253 This overcrowding not only
threatened the structural safety of area homes, but also often created unsanitary living conditions.
It was the hope of WAICO that with additional housing options available, the threats that
accompanied overcrowding would be diminished. In addition to the safety benefits, these
supplementary homes, along with others that were designed for the area, would produce over
$53,000 per year in property taxes, a goal of federally funded urban renewal programs already in
place in Milwaukee.254 While only two home were constructed and one rehabilitated, they
proved that WAICO was able to accomplish urban redevelopment projects in half the time and
with one tenth of the costs used in other Milwaukee urban renewal projects.255
During the latter months of 1969 and early months of 1970, WAICO focused its attention
on the Triangle Area, completing a marketability study with the help of the Stefaniak Group and
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the Department of City Development; this study was supported by Mayor Henry W. Maier and
many Milwaukee Aldermen and was used to determine what types of developments would thrive
in that particular setting. The study revealed what WAICO and area residents hoped it would:
that this area should primarily be used for residential development.256 In January of 1970,
WAICO was awarded a county owned tract of surplus county land at North Eleventh Street,
which would later be known as Phase I of WAICO’s redevelopment initiative.257 With the help
of an anonymous backer, the WAICO Triangle redevelopment project was finally able to
commence on several lots that previously held vacant buildings.258 In addition to this anonymous
backer, individuals throughout Greater Milwaukee were called upon to provide aid in real estate,
legal issues, architecture, and engineering.259 For WAICO, these projects marked “the start of
building what WAICO hope[d would] be an ever more beautiful neighborhood with lots of new
homes among many more improved homes in ‘self-help urban renewal.’”260
By 1969, WAICO’s member list grew to 204 individuals and companies, providing a
significant amount of financial backing. These members spanned from Pewaukee to Madison,
Wauwatosa to West Allis, and as far away as Topeka, Kansas; Scarsdale, New York; Braintree,
Massachusetts; and La Mesa, California.261 Additional resources came from the local gas
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company who donated an oven to the WAICO house, a local Garden Club who donated $1,000
for tot lot construction, and a $30,000 grant from the City of Milwaukee for a playground.262
Bohemian Hall, an older structure in the area on Twelfth Street and Reservoir Street, was
purchased by a wealthy individual and donated to WAICO. This structure would be used as a
Community Center for all types of activities, emphasizing youth programs and staffed by Urban
Affairs students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.263 After several years of working
with WAICO, twenty people, most of whom were architects, formed Architects Concerned in
WAICO (ACW) and pledged $950 worth of time per month to aid in the redevelopment of the
WAICO area. ACW members wanted to create spaces comparable to those that existed in
outlying suburbs, complete with sizable lots for large families and a place where residents felt
secure and could continue to progress in a positive direction.264 All of these combined efforts
became pieces of the forward evolution of the organization and the community as a whole.
Although WAICO had come across its fair share of roadblocks in the previous five years,
nothing would compare to the obstacles it would face as a major player in Milwaukee’s central
city redevelopment. By the late 1970s, Milwaukee County voted to sell thirty-nine parcels of
land to WAICO for $20,000 to use for the development of twenty homes.265 However, upon
further exploration by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), WAICO
would be unable to build any new homes on these parcels of land due to the lack of housing in
the city for those that would be displaced by the demolition of the parcels. While HUD looked at
the entire city, it neglected to look at the housing that would be demolished in the WAICO area,
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most of which was vacant, leaving WAICO with $20,000 and no land options for the start of
Phase I.266

WAICO as a Powerful Voice
The expansion into the creation of housing while keeping a firm commitment to area
residents marks a significant leap for the Black community contained both within the WAICO
area and City of Milwaukee as a whole. The city had never seen such a powerful advocate with
connections to other community leaders for the creation of low-income housing and the
promotion of Black residents’ desires in the planning process. Although the leap that WAICO
took from repainting and revamping existing homes to becoming financially invested in the
creation of new housing was a large one, the support that the organization gained from area
residents, organizational members, and organizational affiliates aided them in making decisions
that kept the direct community in mind.
The strategy of seeking and accepting outside support is reminiscent of a tactic used to
start businesses in the original Bronzeville area. Just as Black business owners accepted outside
support from white businessmen and women, WAICO was willing to integrate outside
community organizations and individuals who showed a commitment to the preservation of the
neighborhood and, thus, a Black sense of place. It can be assumed that WAICO leaders knew
that to continue to have a significant impact on the Black community, they would need to be
willing to accept outside aid in several realms including planning and finances. Because of their
commitment to the larger community, they were willing to do so while maintaining the integrity
of the organization’s mission. WAICO was also extremely successful in promoting the small
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victories of the Black community and pushing the organization’s accomplishments into the
spotlight, fostering Black voices and Black activism.
As in the response to the growing strength of the Bronzeville community, obstructions
from outsiders and other entities seeking to develop land in the WAICO area threatened the
forward progress of WAICO development projects. Companies and corporations began to take
notice of the potential for land development for urban renewal projects in the WAICO area and
worked diligently to secure the land for these projects. The desires and needs of area residents
would not be incorporated into these projects, just as they had been disregarded when
construction projects were planned for the Bronzeville area. The similarities between the
strengths and ultimate demise of Bronzeville and the roadblocks that WAICO encountered as it,
too, gained strength cannot be ignored. But even as these outside forces sought to satisfy their
own interests, the organization and area residents remained steadfast and committed to their
neighborhood and one another.

Milwaukee: A Model City?
Shifts in the strategies that the federal government employed meant that WAICO
received a boost from a federal program put into place in 1966 by President Lyndon Johnson
called Model Cities. Much like previous urban renewal legislation, Model Cities was “designed
to remove or arrest blight and decay in entire sections and neighborhoods, and to improve the
quality of life of the people who live in these sections and neighborhoods through a
concentration of Federal and local programs.”267 This program required that a city receiving a
Model City program designation would address ten overall objectives:
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1) To rebuild or revitalize slum and blighted areas
2) To expand housing
3) To expand job and income opportunities
4) To reduce dependence on welfare payments
5) To improve educational facilities and programs
6) To combat disease and ill health
7) Reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency
8) To enhance recreational and cultural opportunities
9) To establish better access between homes and jobs
10) To improve living conditions for the people living in these areas268
While Milwaukee Mayor Henry W. Maier twice pushed for the approval of the Common
Council to apply to become a Model City in 1967, it was not until March of 1968 that they
ultimately approved the act of applying for federal dollars.269 By the end of 1968, Milwaukee
received an assurance of $40 million in Model Cities funding for urban redevelopment
projects.270 It was not until the 1970s, however, that WAICO received any sort of financial
assistance from the Model Cities program. In early 1970, the organization received $135,000 for
general operating costs, a small portion of the total amount WAICO was promised for future
projects.271
It was also during this time that the plans for the Park East freeway were being heavily
scrutinized by court officials. Although WAICO had already conducted several studies of the
Triangle area, HUD ordered additional environmental impact assessments and WAICO took
another hit. Due to the total enclosure of the Triangle Area by proposed freeways, HUD
determined that the site was unsuitable for residential development. These findings were not
268
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represented in any studies WAICO had previously piloted. This new study was conducted in
direct response to the desires of many local stakeholders for the construction of large structures
and compounds for companies to bid on in hopes that big businesses would return to the City of
Milwaukee. In response, WAICO President, James Richardson, stated that the environmental
hazards found have been hazards that “[B]lacks have been forced to live with for decades with
little concern about air and noise pollution… If [B]lacks will not be allowed to seek housing they
want in neighborhoods near freeways… where do they go?”272 Henry S. Reuss, Democratic
Wisconsin Congressman and supporter of WAICO, wrote a letter to George Romney, then
Secretary of HUD, to look at WAICO’s case personally to determine whether or not Romney
could overturn HUD’s decision.273
By June of 1972, George Romney sent HUD representatives to Milwaukee to evaluate
the Triangle Area Phase I and assured Henry S. Reuss that their findings would be used to either
help WAICO find other suitable land for redevelopment or would review an additional
application for this land “showing how the environmental problems can be mitigated.”274 On July
14, 1972, HUD reversed its decision, pending the adoption of noise abatement standards.275 With
the promise of financial backing for noise abatement berms from Model Cities, WAICO was
able to focus their attention, once again, on land acquisition and the relocation of area residents
to move forward with the first phase of redevelopment: constructing 107 housing units.276
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The successes of WAICO thrust them into the national spotlight during a conference
entitled “Lessons Learned Through Model Cities” held in Chicago in October of 1972. Model
Cities Associate Director, John H. Givens, Jr., called WAICO “a success story in grass-roots
development” and acknowledged that WAICO had been working to rebuild their community
long before Model Cities even existed. Along with President Richardson, WAICO was
represented at this conference by their partners in redevelopment, SPA/REDCO and Recht,
Goldin & Siegel.277 Discussions during the Chicago conference allowed WAICO to realize that
they were not the only Model Cities project facing barriers and were asked to visit two
redevelopment projects in other cities to advise their staff.278 WAICO leaders returned to
Milwaukee with a new sense of pride and more determination than ever to ensure the
development of new housing options for WAICO residents.
By the end of 1972, Model Cities had given WAICO $546,000 for the development of
WAICO’s Triangle Area, which they used to buy land, tear down properties, relocate individuals
and families, and pay a small WAICO staff of six people.279 Out of the fifty-two properties
WAICO needed to acquire for total razing for Phase I, only three remained out of WAICO’s
financial control. These three properties were owned by individuals who had acquired the
properties from deceased relatives and by individuals who had no interest in retaining the
property. Thus, by late 1973, WAICO acquired these estates.280 Finally, after years of work, on
September 25, 1973, it was determined that WAICO’s Phase I project satisfied all of HUD’s
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requirements and was awarded $1.8 million in federal funding for the construction of their lowincome housing project.281
On October 6, 1973, Mayor Henry W. Maier helped WAICO break ground for Phase I of
the WAICO Triangle and praised WAICO residents stating, “…this project is a reminder of what
people can do in their own neighborhood if they work together under dedicated neighborhood
leadership.”282 Maier’s speech focused on the collaboration of citizens and government to create
change and testified that these 107 units of housing would represent this collaboration long after
Model Cities programming ended, which ultimately occurred under the leadership of President
Richard Nixon.283
The destruction of the Model Cities program, along with the passage of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, which eliminated federal funding for urban renewal
projects as well as National Housing Partnership Grants, meant that WAICO lost a significant
amount of financial backing.284 This withdrawal of funds significantly threatened the completion
of WAICO Phase I. It also meant that WAICO had to drastically cut back on spending, including
paid staff members, travel compensation, consultants, and office overhead.285
WAICO received another devastating blow when prices in the housing industry became
so inflated that their longtime partners, Recht, Goldin & Seigel, withdrew their support due to
rising construction costs that made construction within HUD regulated mortgage limits
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impossible.286 The inflation that was present in the housing market invaded other markets as well
as investors and government entities sought to globalize markets and create additional liquidity
to attempt to create additional stability and financing.287 Although their partners withdrew
support, WAICO leaders and residents persisted. A new developer, Matt Starck and Sons, was
approached and asked to reevaluate WAICO’s Phase I for contracting. Although Starck and Sons
set their fee at just under $2 million, much lower than Recht, Goldin & Seigel, HUD promised
only $1.8 million in financial backing for the project. WAICO leaders dug in their heels and
were awarded just under $190,000 from the County to make up for the discrepancy. WAICO
benefactor, Mrs. Whyte, donated over $40,000 to help the organization gain letters of credit for
continued construction.288
With construction finally beginning on WAICO’s first full-scale housing project, the
organization began to look ahead at what would happen once people moved in. With the help of
a $35,000 grant from the City of Milwaukee, three WAICO staff members were retained and
focused on two objectives: creating a sense of community for new residents and facilitating the
construction of Phases II (36 units) and III (56 units) with the help of community volunteers.289
By September of 1975, Phase I and its 107 housing units were completed with a 100 percent
occupancy rate. New applications were coming in faster than the housing became available.
Because of this, James Richardson reached out to political figures, such as Mayor Henry W.
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Maier and 7th District Supervisor Terrance L. Pitts, in support of WAICO to push for the
approval of funds for the construction of Phase II.290 The desire for public housing options, such
as Phase I of the WAICO project, was seen in other cities throughout the United States. As
Arnold R. Hirsch uncovers, Chicago’s Ida B. Wells public housing project opened with 1,662
units available and 17,544 applications received to fill these units.291
Although it took another two years, by early 1978, Phases II and III were approved for
funding by HUD and in collaboration with the National Housing Partnership (NHP).292 Phase
II’s groundbreaking was scheduled for July 22, 1978, symbolizing the power of community.293
Although much information is missing from the time of the groundbreaking to the actual grand
opening festivities in June of 1981, it can be assumed that issues similar to those surrounding the
construction of Phase I were encountered, stalling construction and completion for almost three
years. This particular grand opening celebration brought WAICO supporters, including
Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Alderman Kevin O’Connor, and the North Division High School
Band, together once again to celebrate the accomplishments of this small community in
Milwaukee. 294
While WAICO accomplished these victories with over 140 units of properties
constructed for low-income individuals and families, Phase III would not be so lucky. In late
1981, WAICO was denied funding for the construction of an additional twenty units to be
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designated as low-income housing properties in the WAICO Triangle Area.295 In order to be
approved, James Richardson and WAICO leaders looked to have Phase III designated as a
facility for the handicapped and elderly. WAICO gained HUD approval and broke ground for a
40-unit housing development, known as Richardson Manor, which was completed in October of
1987.296
Although WAICO’s goal was to complete 500 units of housing in the Triangle Area, by
1987 183 units of housing were built.297 This amount of housing units is evidence of the
significance of collaboration on multiple levels, including citizens, neighborhoods, city leaders,
and national leaders, to create positive community change. It is also indicative of the hardships
and difficulties that the WAICO group faced when trying to create housing to accommodate their
growing numbers and the members of the larger Black population that had been displaced.
Though there was a continued need for low-income housing options, larger entities that had
significant influence in the housing market were often successful in stifling those needs.
However, WAICO area citizens did not abandon the needs of the Black community and, instead,
worked together to improve their immediate environment and create better housing options for
themselves, a huge accomplishment for the Black community as a whole.
For the duration that WAICO existed, the organization employed a varied of strategies to
encourage the integration of Black voices into the decisions that directly affected not only their
neighborhoods, but their sense of self, sense of place, and sense of community identity. While
these strategies varied, they had one end goal: the positive promotion and forward progression of
the Black community. By highlighting the accomplishments of WAICO and integrating their
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narrative into descriptions of the Black urban experience, the predominant view of Black
residents as idle and inactive in terms of community transformation can be challenged and
perceptions can begin to change.

Conclusion
Though a large split was constructed through the Bronzeville community during the
period of urban renewal, many of the positive and progressive characteristics that were present in
the neighborhood persisted in the smaller areas that survived beyond urban renewal projects. In
order to assure that these areas would remain for area residents, primarily lower income Black
people, inhabitants needed to work together to preserve and create better housing options for
themselves in the area in which they were most comfortable. The creation of the Walnut Area
Improvement Council, Inc. was a step in the direction of stability for those residents displaced by
urban renewal projects, for the residents that lived within WAICO’s boundaries, and, ultimately,
the Black community as a whole.
Just as churches, social clubs, families, and businesses were social institutions in
Bronzeville, WAICO can be seen as a social institution in one of the fragmented pieces of
Bronzeville. WAICO employed strategies to influence the way that area residents carried and
valued themselves. Initially, WAICO utilized tactics that sought to improve the physical nature
of the WAICO area. Trash cleanups, abandoned car removal, and exterior remodeling and
repainting were central to the organization’s efforts. While these activities were important, they
did not overshadow larger strategies aimed at creating a self-reliant community: positive
engagement of youth and teens, job skills training, educational programming, and life skills
training. Ultimately, WAICO sought to promote the intrinsic value of the Black community
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through stimulating the inclusion of the Black voice in many different arenas. The formation of a
WAICO newsletter, the continued coverage of WAICO actions by local news sources, and the
engagement of public figures with a fair amount of power bolstered their reputation and their
efforts and cast a bright light on the positive attributes of the Black community. The commitment
of the organization to area residents could not be denied and with each strategy WAICO
employed, community members increasingly rallied around them. Buy in from community
members was crucial during this time period because of the distrust that urban renewal projects
had created.
The root shock that many Black community members felt lingered for years after the
initial destruction of their homes and businesses and the displacement they suffered. Even those
who were not directly ripped from their homes felt the effects of urban renewal efforts. Because
of the close proximity to the construction of I-43, it is safe to assume that many WAICO area
residents took on boarders or family members who had been directly affected by demolition
projects. Residents of WAICO were also unable to reach what remained of Bronzeville on the
opposite side of the expressway. Enduring businesses and residents were virtually cut off from
one another, creating a physical and emotional rift and a destruction of a Black sense of place.
Thus, creating a sense of continuity, cohesion, and support within the fractured pieces of
Bronzeville was important. Residents and neighbors needed to be reassured that further
displacement and the effects of root shock would not continue to disrupt their livelihoods.
WAICO worked diligently to provide a foundation of support and continuity, with particular
emphasis on a sense of place manifested in the housing sector.
The progression of the organization from one that restored homes and the area’s physical
space to one involved in the creation of housing did come rapidly, but proved to be a task that the
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Black community, as a whole, was ready for. By creating new homes for local residents to
inhabit, the preservation of a Black sense of place could be realized. These homes would also
allow for additional displaced Black community members from Bronzeville to remain in an area
where they could feel the sense of community that was present in the larger area. Though this
new undertaking took the support of many outside individuals, WAICO was able to maintain
ultimate control over project directions. This control was crucial in order to guarantee that the
integrity of WAICO’s mission was being upheld and that the needs of the immediate community
were being met. With direct involvement in the process of housing creation for a targeted portion
of Milwaukee’s Black population, WAICO was able to negate a stereotype that accompanied
being designated as a Black individual.
The involvement of community members outside of the direct WAICO area, especially
those individuals that held a fair amount of power, such as Mayor Henry W. Maier, various
Aldermen, and Congressman Henry S. Reuss, also marked a shift in the way that Black people
were perceived in certain sections of society. WAICO served as a representative of the Black
community in local media outlets, most heavily in the Milwaukee Journal and the Milwaukee
Sentinel, but also garnered the attention of federal entities as a Model City project area. While
this change was significant for some, for others, stereotypical and negative perceptions of the
Black community continued to endure. The continued growth of WAICO’s member base
indicated that the reach of the organization’s efforts and triumphs were being recognized on a
national scale. The WAICO area and its residents became a symbol of Black progression for
many as it continued to overcome obstacles to create low-income housing for Black residents in
Milwaukee.
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The completion of Phase I showcased the desire of Black community members to remain
in areas familiar to them. While low-income housing constructed through urban renewal projects
by outside development firms was created, it was not created in a space familiar to those that
were meant to occupy them. Phase I low-income housing options were 100 percent filled to
capacity with a waiting list to keep apartments occupied for years to come. This can directly be
attributed to the sense of community and belonging that accompanied the Bronzeville
neighborhood before it was torn in half and the sense of solidarity that WAICO helped to create.
Although Phases II and III did not come as quickly as WAICO had desired and as promptly as
they was needed, portions of the initial plans did come to fruition, marking the tenacity of the
organization and area residents.
Changes in the various economic markets accompanied shifts in the focus of
governmental entities. Instead of being focused on localized urban renewal efforts, the federal
government and, thus, local markets, shifted towards a more globalized economy. This meant
less emphasis on localized efforts that could potentially cost more and more emphasis on
cheaper, far-reaching approaches, including packaged-mortgages and tax exemptions for massproduced goods and services. With this shift away from community development, WAICO found
it more and more difficult to retain long-term partnerships as well as financial backing for
projects that would directly benefit the immediate community. It was only through the
manipulation of the vision of Phase III of the Triangle Project from low-income housing to
housing for the elderly and disabled that it was constructed. After Phase III’s completion, the
organization found it too difficult to exist as it once had.
Because of the shifts in governmental priorities, Milwaukee’s Black community lost a
portion of its foundation as the efforts of WAICO became less prominent and decreasingly
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viable. Once again, the Black community’s needs were pushed aside to make way for what
society deemed to be the next step in its evolution. While this larger shift caused WAICO to
cease to be a formal nonprofit organization, the exploration of its successes and development are
a crucial part of Black Milwaukee’s history. The existence of WAICO also demonstrates the
retention of the sense of community that was present in Bronzeville before the physical rift of the
expressway was constructed. The development of a grassroots, community led organization that
represented the interests of Black people and promoted Black solidarity and support in the face
of federally sustained destruction of the Black community was a huge asset that deserves
promotion and further exploration.
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Chapter Four
Conclusions and Implications for Current and Future Research

The exploration of the Black urban experience surrounding and in response to federal and
local urban renewal legislation and efforts is crucial to understanding, interpreting, and adding to
current scholarship on Black history in Milwaukee. By advocating for a more complete
understanding, interpretation, and addition of missing histories, pieces of important Black history
can be inserted back into the history of the United States. The examination of Black experiences
is important due to the fact that a significant portion of Black history has been left out of current
scholarship, either deliberately or unintentionally. This erasure of Black history is detrimental to
the Black community as a whole as it continues to portray Black people as largely inactive apart
from actions surrounding iconic histories, such as the Underground Railroad and the Civil Rights
movement. This stereotypical perceptions of Black people as inactive continues to plague the
community today. However, by piecing together a rebuttal to this stereotype, the perception of
the Black community as a whole can change. Omitting pieces of Black history is also harmful to
current and future generations who will end up losing any connection to this history if they are
not recorded before evidence of them is destroyed.
By exploring the existing scholarship of Gilbert Osofsky, James R. Grossman, Arnold R.
Hirsch, Thomas J. Sugrue, and David M. P. Freund surrounding New York City’s Harlem,
Chicago, and Detroit, one gains the perspective that the pressures put on Black communities to
settle in certain sections of the city were analogous in cities across the United States. Black
residents were forced into sections of the city abandoned through white flight, the use of
destructive language, and the manipulation of societal perceptions. Organized groups of realtors,
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lawmakers, and Neighborhood Improvement Associations deliberately took action to bar Black
residents from sections of the city and used the vitality of the housing market to influence city
resident’s views. By utilizing these tactics, residential segregation persisted and became a
“natural” part of market fluctuations and immediate environments.
As deindustrialization and white flight continued to affect cities across the United States,
the federal government took action in the form of urban renewal legislation. Projects deemed as
urban renewal targeted specific sections of the city that contained blight and substandard
housing. Not surprisingly, these areas were the same areas in which Black communities existed.
Thus, urban renewal projects can be seen as a form of urbicide, or the specific targeting of
sections of the city for annihilation. By eradicating the blight that existed within cities, Black
people and neighborhoods that had been forcefully created would be destroyed and Black
residents would be forced to disperse. This demolition destroyed thriving Black communities in
an intentional and targeted way. In addition to the physical destruction of Black communities, an
internal sense of place was simultaneously devastated. Just as Black communities were working
to create cohesive neighborhoods and unity within their forced borders complete with Blackowned businesses and the ability to own homes, their sense of place was destroyed with the
passing of urban renewal legislation and subsequent projects. A larger conversation about the
negative effects of urban renewal projects did not appear until thousands of structures had been
demolished and thousands more residents were displaced.
Accompanying the conversation of the destruction of a Black sense of place is the
concept of root shock or the emotional effects that are tied to the physical destruction of the
Black community. This physical destruction creates an environment of distrust, anxiety,
destabilization, and an increase in stress. Thus, not only did urban renewal destroy the physical
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space of Black residents, but it also produced an environment of emotional upheaval for
generations to come. All of the scholars referenced in this research project represent a portion of
what comprises the entirety of the Black urban experience. Combined, they lay the foundation
for future scholars to explore the Black urban experience utilizing some of the same tactics
present in their research. It is through the use of these approaches that the history of the Walnut
Street area from its creation through the major years of urban renewal initiatives was explored.
In spite of the structural institutions and forces that shaped the Black urban landscape of
Milwaukee, Black community members learned to lean on one another to create a safety net of
support, helped one another start and maintain businesses, aided one another in the procurement
of resources, both financial and material, and created thriving communities of unity and
encouragement through hard work and perseverance. Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was a prime
example of how hard work and perseverance could create community cohesion. Local residents
and all-Black social clubs supported Black entrepreneurs so that they could sustain themselves in
a white-dominated business sector and to keep financial resources within the forced borders of
Bronzeville. In this same vein, area businesses employed local residents and teens to keep
employment options in close proximity to living situations and to keep youth out of trouble.
These same social clubs assisted area residents in times of financial distress and emotional
upheaval. Youth and teen activities were planned with the hopes of providing life skills, athletic
opportunities, and a safe place for socialization. Neighbors knew neighbors and worked together
to create a stable and productive environment for Bronzeville’s Black community. As the
strengths and power of the Black community continued to grow, the federal government passed
legislation widely known as urban renewal.
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Under the leadership of Milwaukee Mayors Frank P. Zeidler and Henry W. Maier, local
urban renewal projects consumed a large portion of Bronzeville. The characteristics present in
Bronzeville - solidarity, support, unity, and community pride, along with the growing political
power of Black residents - can be seen as threats to continued white domination in the city. Thus,
local lawmakers and those in power sought out Bronzeville for urban renewal projects and
willfully destroyed the Black community that existed there. The larger population saw
Milwaukee’s urban renewal projects as positive additions to the city’s vitality and economic
base. As a result, little to no regard was given to the lives and livelihoods that were destroyed by
them. Even after the Black community began to “make some noise” in regards to the housing
options they were given, decision makers and developers had their own agendas in mind.
Displaced residents were given few options to relocate, particularly the option to relocate to a
dwelling in close proximity to what was left of Bronzeville. What resulted was the continued
overcrowding of an already limited housing stock and sustained negative perceptions and
stereotypes of the Black community were also perpetuated due to the continuous use of specific
jargon and the targeting of certain areas of the city. However, in response to continued urban
renewal projects threatening the displacement of additional Black bodies and the destruction of
housing options, a small part of what was once Bronzeville organized their resources to combat
the people and machines that threatened their homes and their sense of place.
The creation of the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc. (WAICO), a grassroots,
community-led organization, marked a significant progression for Milwaukee’s Black
community as the organization became a powerful voice for the people and kept the desires and
needs of local Black residents in mind. WAICO was formed by a group of local individuals
seeking to preserve the integrity of their community and the structures that existed there.
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Utilizing local residents, WAICO was able to significantly impact the physical environment of
their neighborhood through area trash cleanups, targeting specific properties for repainting and
general repairs, conducting area walk-throughs to locate abandoned vehicles, and sodding vacant
lots. At the same time, WAICO worked to continue to represent characteristics contained within
Bronzeville by engaging area youth in ways that would promote life skills, stability, and a sense
of kinship. These initial undertakings brought attention to the area and thrust the organization
and their efforts into the spotlight.
Before long, WAICO began the task of creating housing options within their borders.
With the help of external advocates, several of whom had a fair amount of power, WAICO was
able to develop plans for three low-income housing projects for those displaced by previous,
current, and future urban renewal projects. While these plans were developed, continued
obstacles, changing legislative priorities, and competition from other development firms caused
these projects to stall and to be manipulated to fit the conditions of changing regulations. Even
though the initial goal of constructing three housing developments for low-income Black
residents did not come to fruition exactly as expected, the triumphs of WAICO cannot be denied.
They became one example of the tenacity of Black-led organizations and accomplished much of
their success utilizing funds and donations generated within the immediate community and
through their supporters nationwide. WAICO, as an organization, was able to develop and evolve
rapidly while keeping the goal of creating a self-reliant community in the forefront. The
organization’s commitment to area residents and advocacy for the Black community cannot be
denied and should be included in narratives of the Black urban experience.
Not only does WAICO represent a negation of popular views of Black residents during
the urban renewal period, it also provides a piece of Milwaukee’s Black history that has largely
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been left out of existing historical pieces. The exploration of WAICO as a crucial element of
Milwaukee’s Black history is imperative. Milwaukee residents who were a part of Bronzeville
and the WAICO area are rapidly aging. Their experiences and histories must be documented so
that researchers and scholars do not lose their understandings and interpretations of urban events
completely. By adding Black histories and giving space to document Black voices within
discussion of the Black urban experience, the dominant view of history from that of influential
white people, can be affected to reflect a more inclusive history instead of the fragments that
currently exist as those who write history often do not represent the whole.
In addition, the continued exploration of the Black urban experience representing the
Black community aids in exposing structural racism and institutionalized disadvantage that
Black residents faced in the past and continue to face today. This includes a discussion about
how those in power use certain jargon and expressions to influence the perceptions of the general
public. Most importantly, however, the exploration of the Black urban experience with these
characteristics in mind serves as a point where the discussion of Black communities can begin to
transform into a discussion including the narratives from the perspective of Black residents.
Although other researchers have explored grassroots and community activism within the
City of Milwaukee, this thesis marks one of the first attempts to include a discussion of WAICO
and the actions the organization took to influence the Black urban landscape within the city into
that scholarship. The narrative of WAICO is both important and poignant. While they were able
to evolve quickly and with little opposition, the moment WAICO became an active force in the
housing market, their forward progress slowed and opposition from developers outside of the
immediate environment began to push back on their progression. It can be assumed, that forward
Black progression in other markets was met with comparable resistance and similar challenges.
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It is the hope of this researcher that through this discussion of WAICO, other aspects of
Milwaukee’s Black community in sectors apart from the housing market will be explored.
Through this, a more complete history of Milwaukee’s Black community can be uncovered and
the view of Black residents as idle and dismissive will be rejected. It is the job of researchers and
scholars to uncover complete truths and this tiny piece of the Black urban experience is an
attempt to do just that.

110

REFERENCES

Books
Black, Ivory Abena. Bronzeville: A Milwaukee Lifestyle. Washington DC: The Publishers Group,
LLC, 2005.
Freund, David M.P. Colored Property: State Policy & White Racial Politics in Suburban
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Fullilove, Mindy Thompson. Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America
and What We Can Do About It. New York: Ballatine, 2004.
Geenen, Paul H. Milwaukee’s Bronzeville 1900-1950. Chicago, IL: Arcadia Publishing, 2006.
Grossman, James R. Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Gurda, John. The Making of Milwaukee. Brookfield, WI: Burton & Mayer, Inc., 1999.
Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second Ghetto: Race & Housing in Chicago 1940-1960. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Jones, Patrick D. The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Osofsky, Gilbert. Harlem, The Making of a Ghetto. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
Prigge, Matthew J. Milwaukee Mayhem: Murder and Mystery in the Cream City’s First Century.
Milwaukee, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2015.
Shadd, Mary Ellen. Negro Business Directory of the State of Wisconsin, 1950-1951. Milwaukee,
WI: Mary Ellen Shadd, 1951.
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Trotter, Joe William, Jr. Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat 1915-1945,
Second Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 2007.

Collections

111

Charlotte Russell Partridge and Miriam Frink Papers 1862-1980, University of WisconsinMilwaukee Archives, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library,
Milwaukee, WI.
Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: Residential Security Map, United States Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1938, University of WisconsinMilwaukee American Geographical Society Library Digital Map Collection, University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI.
Raasch, Nettie L. From the Cotton Patch to the Inner City Manuscript of James Richardson
Biography. Frank P. Zeidler Humanities Room, Milwaukee Public Library, Milwaukee,
WI.
Record of the Henry W. Maier Administration 1960-1988, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Archives, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI.
Reuss, Henry S. Papers 1839-1982, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Archives, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI.
Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records 1936-1990, University of WisconsinMilwaukee Archives, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library,
Milwaukee, WI.

Dictionary Entries
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “blight,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/blight.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “inner city,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/inner%20city.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “renewal,” accessed November 8, 2015, http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/renewal.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “slum,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/slum.

Government Documents
Howard, Needles, Tammen, & Bergendoff Consulting Engineers. Milwaukee County
Expressway Commission: Lake Front Expressway. March 1963. University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI.

112

Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City. Final Report
to the Honorable Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of Milwaukee. April 15, 1960. University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI.

Journal Articles
Geib, Paul. “From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study of the Southern Black Migration to
Milwaukee, 1940-1970.” The Journal of Negro History 83, no. 4 (1998): 229-248.
Gotham, Kevin Fox. “Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of Racial Residential
Segregation in a US City, 1900-50.” International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research 24, no. 3 (September 2000): 616-633.
Kim, Sunwoong. “Race and Home Price Appreciation in Urban Neighborhoods: Evidence from
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.” The Review of Black Political Economy 28, no. 2 (2000): 9-28.
McKittrick, Katherine. “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place.” Social and
Cultural Geography 12, no. 8 (December 2011): 947-960.
Squires, Gregory D., DeWolfe, Rebecca, and DeWolfe, Alan S. “Urban Decline or
Disinvestment: Uneven Development, Redlining and the Role of the Insurance Industry.”
Social Problems 27, no. 1 (1979): 79-95.
Teaford, Jon. “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath.” Housing Policy Debate 11, no. 2 (2000): 443465.
Weber, Rachel. “Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment.”
Antipode 34, no. 3 (July 2002): 519-540.
Zipp, Samuel and Carriere, Michael. “Introduction: Thinking through Urban Renewal.” Journal
of Urban History 39, no. 3 (2012): 359-365.

Magazine Articles
Luhrssen, Dave. “Walnut Street Rhythm.” Milwaukee Magazine, August 1993.
McBride, Genevieve G. and Byers, Stephen R. “The First Mayor of Black Milwaukee: J.
Anthony Josey.” Wisconsin Magazine of History 91, no. 2, 2008.

Newspaper Articles
Ahlers, Joe. “Bronzeville: Past, Present and Future.” mke, February 22, 2007.

113

Unknown Author. “From the Civil Rights Trenches to City Hall,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
August 1, 2007, accessed September 30, 2015,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/32420014.html.

Online Articles
Johnson, Mutope. “The Old Heart of Milwaukee’s African America Could Beat Again.” Urban
Milwaukee, August 18, 2013, accessed February 22, 2016, http://
http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2013/08/18/bronzeville-the-old-heart-of-milwaukees-africanamerica-could-beat-again/.
Theses/Dissertations
Vick, William A. “From Walnut Street to No Street: Afro-American Businesses, 1945-1967.”
MA Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1993.

114

